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This article uses post-colonial theory to examine the cluster of international hu-
man rights known as economic, social and cultural rights. The article surveys the
jurisprudence of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
making it relevant for scholars of international human rights as well as post-
colonial theory.
Traditionally, international human rights divide into two branches: 1) civil and
political rights, and 2) economic, social and cultural rights (ESCRs). ESCRs were
virtually ignored during the cold war era, but they now receive expanded attention
at the international and regional levels. The creation of the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the mid-1980s began this process. The
Committee has been highly inﬂuential in ESCR norm development.
Post-colonialism is a branch of critical theory aimed at exposing the exploitative
and paternalistic legacy of the international community’s relationship to former
colonies in the developing world. There is a small body of post-colonial theory
literature examining international human rights, but it focuses on civil and po-
litical rights. The author, a specialist in ESCRs, seeks to engage theorists with
another branch of human rights. ESCRs should be of interest to post-colonial
theorists because these rights implicate economic national sovereignty, most im-
portantly social spending. Developing country social spending has been uniquely
politicized in post-colonial north-south relations through controversies over struc-
tural adjustment and trade liberalization.Post-colonial theorists should acknowledge that emerging ESCR jurisprudence
and Committee procedures are responsive to north-south concerns on many lev-
els. For example, the Committee’s Concluding Observations concentrate on rec-
ommendations rather than on “violations.” This modality permits sensitivity to
differential southern budgetary realities while facilitating critique of wealthy egal-
itarian countries. A second example is that the Committee is progressive, within
its limited means, about facilitating participation by ”subaltern” southern groups.
Animportantchallengepost-colonialtheorypresentstotheemergingESCRregime
is the Committee’s record on encouraging southern governments to protect social
welfare spending from external pressure. What does it mean for a country to cut
social spending by IMF mandate, incur external debt for large-scale development
projects through World Bank, and lower trade barriers pursuant to the WTO, only
to be condemned by a UN human rights body for any resulting intensiﬁcation of
hunger, ill health and population displacement? The Committee could adjust its
processes to better address this conundrum by routinely pursuing and analyzing
information about the status of international negotiations.3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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Post-colonial theory can provide a meaningful interrogation of the goals 
and methods of the human rights regime.  With its concern for exposing the 
exploitative  and  paternalistic  legacy  of  the  international  community’s 
developing world agenda, the post-colonial inquiry offers an opportunity to 
the human rights community to revisit its mandate. The international law 
branch  of  this  theoretical  school  arose  contemporaneously
2  with  a  late-
developing area of human rights known as economic, social and cultural 
rights.
3  Although economic, social and cultural rights formed a significant 
part  of  the  original  post-war  body  of  human  rights  doctrine,  they  were 
casualties of ideologically based Cold War politics, remaining unenforced 
and underdeveloped until the creation of the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social  and Cultural Rights (the “Committee”) in the late 1980s. 
Economic,  social  and  cultural  rights  in  turn  pose  a  challenge  to  the 
general  post-colonial  critique  of  human  rights  law.    The  Committee’s 
primary subject matter - macroeconomic spending priorities and welfare 
policies,  and  their  effect  on  poverty  alleviation  and  minorities  –  falls 
squarely within southern policy terrain the colonial powers most famously 
resisted  relinquishing.  Yet  the  Committee’s  recommendations  often  run 
counter  to  the  liberal  international  financial  mandates  that  the  south
4
* This Article expands on a presentation delivered at the Postcolonial Law: The Uses 
of Theory in Law Reform Projects conference.  The presentation was solicited as a human 
rights expert’s statement to a panel of theorists considering the post-colonial implications of 
internationally initiated law reform projects. 
2.  Post-colonial theory recently expanded from a focus on literature and history to a 
more detailed exploration of law; the first works cited in a recent compilation date to the 
mid-1980s.  See  Peter  Fitzpatrick  &  Eve  Darian-Smith,  Laws  of  the  Postcolonial:  An 
Insistent Introduction, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 1, 15 n. 7 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter 
Fitzpatrick  eds.,  1999)  (noting  that  engagements  between  law  and  postcolonialism  have 
been infrequent, astonishing, and understable).
3.  “Economic, social and cultural rights” is a term of art in international law referring 
to the corpus of human rights standards that is distinguished from the standards termed 
“civil and political rights.”
4.  Many writers struggle with the appropriate designation for the former colonies and 
the former colonizers. See, e.g., D.K. FIELDHOUSE, THE WEST AND THE THIRD WORLD 1-3 
(1999) (exploring whether the Third World countries have benefited or suffered from close 
economic  relationships  with  the  more  developed  countries  of  the  West);  ROBERT  J.C. 
YOUNG, POSTCOLONIALISM: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 4-5 (2001).  It remains to be 3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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unsuccessfully resisted for decades. Moreover, southern non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) have consistently advocated for including ESCRs 
in  the  civil  society  agenda  while  most  international  NGOs  are  still 
struggling with the decision to take up these rights.
Many  specific  aspects  of  the  Committee’s  jurisprudence  respond 
effectively  to  the  concerns  of  postcolonial  theory,  such  as  its  use  of 
equalization paradigms and enforcement language, interpretation of its anti-
discrimination  mandate,  and  the  audience  for  its  recommendations.    In 
other  ways,  the  Committee’s  work  confirms  a  traditional  north-south 
critique of the human rights regime, such as the Committee’s treatment of 
culturally based practices.  Part IV of this Article reviews these aspects of 
the Committee’s jurisprudence in detail, particularly focusing on the now 
extensive body of Concluding Observations.
One key north-south sensitive exhortation is that the Committee should 
expand  its  efforts  to  address  the  financial  issues  that  most  concern  the 
countries where economic, social and cultural rights are in deepest crisis.  
The Committee is a natural partner to former colonies to protest debt loads 
and to leverage international financial institution (“IFI”) and development 
aid  funds  in  the  direction  of  poverty  alleviation.  Within  its  limited 
resources, the Committee should continue to expand its inquiries into the 
effects of the debt process, dealings of Member States with the IFIs, and 
development aid on the economic, social and cultural rights of the poor.  
The Committee should also consider more explicitly publicizing concerns 
about private actors that impact ESCRs.  To the extent that anti-poverty 
human rights bodies such as the Committee advocate for a continuation of 
coercive practices such as conditioning of aid, these recommendations may 
depart  from  the  post-colonial  paradigm,  which  generally  favors  the 
restoration of autonomy to former colonies.
II. UNIQUE INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights monitors the 
International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights 
(“CESCR” or the “Committee”), the world’s first international treaty to 
elevate  basic  welfare  needs  of  the  poor  to  the  level  of  human  rights.  
Political  hostility  toward  this  class  of  rights  delayed  the  Committee’s 
formation  for  more  than  a  decade  after  most  of  the  other  UN  treaty 
monitoring bodies and limited involvement of the human rights regime in 
seen whether Young’s choice, “tri-continental” will hold sway as a substitute reference to 
poor  countries  (“tricontinentalism”  as  a  substitute  for  the  term  postcolonial).    In  the 
meantime,  the  present  author  will  alternate  amongst  several  commonly  used  terms: 
South/North, East/West, developing/industrialized.3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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poverty issues.  Since 1986, by progressively interpreting its mandate, the 
Committee has greatly furthered the jurisprudential credibility of economic, 
social and cultural rights and maintained its status in a difficult political 
atmosphere.  The  Committee’s  sixteen  years  in  existence  form  the  most 
important chapter in the history of economic, social and cultural rights, and 
to  analyze  the  Committee’s  work  requires  an  understanding  of  the 
particular politics of that subject matter.
A. East Against West: Which Rights are Human Rights?
The  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  (UDHR)
5  recorded  the 
immediate  post-WWII  consensus
6  regarding  moral  standards  for 
government  behavior  toward  its  citizenry.  The  United  States 
enthusiastically  participated  in  promulgating  the  UDHR,  which  was 
intended  to  be  the  UN  Charter’s  Bill  of  Rights.
7  The  UDHR’s  drafters 
based it in part on the conception of rights contained in President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s  famous  1941  Four  Human  Freedoms  speech.
8  The  “four 
freedoms” were freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, 
freedom from want, and freedom from fear.
The civil and political rights enshrined in the UDHR and the treaties that 
followed it read like an updated version of the U.S. Bill of Rights.  These 
protections include freedom of expression, right to political participation, 
freedom from cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, right to effective 
remedies, freedom of religion and right to non-discriminatory treatment.
9 In 
5.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., Pt. I, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (recognizing the inherent 
dignity and the equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family is essential to 
freedom, justice, and peace in the world).
6.  The term “consensus” is used advisedly, referring only to the very high percentage 
of endorsements the UDHR received in the 1948 General Assembly.  Forty-eight of the 
then-58 General Assembly members voted in favor of the UDHR, with eight abstentions and 
two states absent from the vote.  See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Magna 
Carta  for  all  Humanity,  United  Nations  Website, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).  As of March 1, 
2002, the United Nations included 189 member states.  See List of Member States, United 
Nations Website, http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2002) 
(listing 189 member states of the United Nations with the dates on which they joined the 
organization).  As many commentators have since noted, the founding principles of the 
international rights regime were established without the direct participation of most of the 
colonized world leadership.
7. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, 
DRAFTING & INTENT 1 (1999) (discussing President Franklin Roosevelt’s enunciation of the 
four freedoms and their influence on the Declaration of the United Nations).
8. Id.
9. See  UDHR,  supra  note  5,  art.  2  (establishing  equal  protection  under  the 
Declaration),  art. 5  (forbidding  cruel  and  inhumane  treatment  or  punishment);  id.  art. 8 
(establishing due process); id. art. 18 (establishing freedom of religion); id. art. 19 (creating 
the  right  of  freedom  of  expression  and  opinion);  id.  art.  21  (establishing  the  right  to 3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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addition  to  these  civil  and  political  rights,  the  UDHR  also  contains 
economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to social security, 
work and favorable work conditions, labor union rights, rest and leisure, 
adequate standard of living, including the right to food, clothing, housing, 
and medical care, the right to education, the right to participate in culture 
and  the  right  to  property.
10  The  Preamble  of  the  UDHR  justifies  this 
selection  with  a  broad  characterization  of  the  basis  for  human  rights: 
“Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed 
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human  person  and  in  the  equal  rights  of  men  and  women  and  have 
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom . . . .”
11
The drafters of the UDHR believed that the UDHR was the precursor to 
a Human Rights Covenant, which would provide a mechanism for making 
the  UDHR  binding  on  individual  ratifying  states.
12  As  the  cold  war 
intensified, the Soviet Union championed ESCRs and the United States 
championed  civil  and  political  rights:  the  Soviet  Union  urged  the 
promulgation of one Covenant listing all the UDHR rights, and the United 
States  insisted  on  locating  ESCRs  in  a  separate  Covenant.
13  The 
forcefulness of the Soviet Union’s advocacy for a unitary regime may have 
been  weakened  by  its  general  concern  about  the  interference  of  the 
international  community  in  domestic  affairs.
14  The  result  was  a  1952 
General Assembly Resolution mandating creation of two treaties instead of 
one.
15
participate, have access and contribute to government).
10. See UDHR, supra note 5, art. 17 (establishing the right to own property); id. art. 22 
(establishing the right to social security and personal development); id. art. 23 (establishing 
the right to work, free choice of employment and just employment conditions); id. art. 24 
(establishing the right to rest and leisure); id. art. 25 (establishing the right to an adequate 
standard of living); id. art. 26 (establishing the right to education); id. art. 27 (establishing 
the right to participate in community cultural life and protection of moral interests).
11. UDHR, supra note 5, preamble.
12. See KITTY ARAMBULO, STRENGTHENING THE SUPERVISION OF  THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: THEORETICAL AND PROCEDURAL 
ASPECTS 15 (1999) (citing U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/53, at p.9 (Dec. 10, 1947)); MORSINK, supra
note  7,  at  19  (emphasizing  the  crucial  difference  between  having  a  right  and  the 
implementation of it).
13. See ARAMBULO, supra note 12, at 15-18.
14. F. Pr￿etacznik, The Social Concept of Human Rights: Its Philosophical Background 
and Political Justification, in REVUE BELGE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 238-52 (1977), noted in
Matthew  Craven,  The  UN  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 455-57 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter 
Craven,  Committee]  (explaining  the  Soviet  states  advocated  that  the  implementation  of 
human rights should take place by means of state action and that international involvement 
should be minimal).
15. See id. at 456 (citing U.N.G.A. Resolution 543 (VI) of 5 February 1952) (asserting 
that the question of whether human rights should be implemented by means of state action 3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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With  the  UDHR,  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political 
Rights
16 (“ICCPR” or the “Civil and Political Rights Covenant”) and the 
International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights
17
(“ICESCR”  or  the  “Covenant”)  form  the  International  Bill  of  Rights.
Though crafted in the same diplomatic process, the enforcement provisions 
of the two Covenants are far from identical. The substantive provisions of 
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant sound, again, like the U.S. bill of 
rights; the language is unequivocal, clean statements defining unassailable 
rights.    Contrarily,  the  drafters  of  the  ICESCR  saddled  it  with  an 
enforcement  clause  that  reads  “Each  State  Party  . . .  undertakes  to  take 
steps , individually and through international assi stance and co-operation, 
especially  economic  and  technical,  to  the  maximum  of  its  available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights  recognized  in  the  present  Covenant  by  all  appropriate  means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”
18
This weaker language reflected the continuing opposition of many of the 
western countries, most prominently the United States.
19 These countries 
felt deep suspicion about the desirability of elevating economic and social 
policies to the level of an unalienable right rather than a personal privilege 
granted  or  withheld  through  the  political  ordering  of  macroeconomic 
priorities.
20  This  liberal  (in  the  Lockian  sense)
21  ideology  overlay  a 
or international action that led the states to draft two separate human rights covenants).
16. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (recognizing that the ideal of 
free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom can only be achieved when everyone 
may enjoy such freedoms).
17. 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR] (recognizing that  the ideal of  free 
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom can only be achieved when economic, 
social, and cultural rights are protected).
18. Id. art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
19. See Craven, Committee, supra note 14, at 456-57.
20. See id.; see also ARAMBULO, supra note 12, at [page numbers to be provided by 
Lyon].  For a comprehensive review of the semi-philosophical debate over the justiciability 
of economic, social and cultural rights, see id., at 53-169.  Compared with the profusion of 
recent attention to promoting the justiciability of ESCRs, see id. at 99-169, there appear to 
be relatively few new arguments against justiciability, see id., at 53-97.  One recent U.S. 
example  arose  in  the  debate  between  Herman  Schwartz  and  Cass  Sunstein  during  the 
revision  of  the  Eastern  European  constitutions.    See  Cass  Sunstein,  Something  Old, 
Something  New,  E.  EUR.  CONST.  REV.,  Spring  1992  at  18  (stating  that  Soviet-style 
constitutions set out general social commitments rather than concrete entitlements); Cass 
Sunstein,  Against  Positive  Rights,  E.  EUR.  CONST.  REV.,  Winter  1993,  at  35  (asserting 
Eastern European constitutions should produce firm liberal rights and the foundation for 
some kind of market economy).  Only the United States continues consistently to advance 
nonjusticiability as a serious proposition in the international human rights political arena.  
See Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, COHRE’s Online Newsletter No. 3 (Apr. 
2001), available at http://www.cohre.org/wkframe.htm (on file with author) (describing “yet 
another unilateral effort” by the United States to contest the legitimacy of economic, social 
and cultural rights).  For recent statements of the United States to the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, see Ambassador George Moose: Explanation of Position and call for a vote 
on  OP  8c:  L.42,  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  (Apr.  20,  2001),  available  at3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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consensus  that,  as  a  practical  matter,  social  conditions  are  simply  too 
complex  to  be  capable  of  evaluation  or  promotion  by  any  adjudicative 
forum.
B. Two Attempts to Create an Effective Monitoring Body
The  Committee’s  turbulent  institutional  history  demonstrates  the 
controversial  nature  of  the  rights  it  monitors.    Like  most  human  rights 
treaties, including the ICCPR, the ICESCR mandates that the States Parties 
to  the  treaty  submit  reports  about  their  adherence  to  the  instrument.
22
However, the ICCPR also establishes a free-standing monitoring body, the 
Human Rights Committee, to receive and consider reports.
23 Each of the 
four major UN human rights treaties that followed the International Bill of 
Rights also established freestanding monitoring committees.
24 In contrast, 
the ICESCR merely orders States Parties to submit their reports to the UN 
Economic and Social Council,
25 leaving control of the ICESCR’s monitors 
in the hands of a fully political body without guidance as to their selection 
http://www.humanrights-usa.net/statements/0420L42.htm (on file with author) (noting the 
U.S. government’s position that ESCRs “are not rights which create immediate, actionable 
entitlements  of  a  citizen  vis-[à]-vis  his  or  her  own  government”);  Ambassador  George 
Moose, U.S. Delegation, UN Commission of Human Rights, EOV: L.12, The Right to Food 
(Apr.  20,  2001),  available  at http://www.humanrights-
usa.net/statements/0420righttofood.htm  (on  file  with  author)  (presenting  the  U.S. 
government’s disagreement with the proposition that “citizens of a State have a human right 
to receive food directly from the government of that State” as well as with the existence of 
“a legal remedy at the national and international levels against a State for those individuals 
who believe their presumed right has been denied”).
21. See LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 3-32 (defending the roots of 
the term “liberal” in the Lockian philosophy of governmental non-intervention).
22. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 40 (requiring state parties to submit reports 
within one year of entry and upon the request of the Committee thereafter); ICESCR, supra
note 17, arts. 16-17 (requiring states to furnish reports in stages in accordance with the 
Economic and Social Council within one year of entry into the covenant).
23. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 28 (consisting of 18 members, composed of state 
representatives  with  high  moral  character  who  are  elected  to  serve  in  their  personal 
capacity).
24. See  International  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Racial 
Discrimin a tion,  660  U.N.T.S.  195,  art.  8  [hereinafter  ICERD];  Convention  on  the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 17 [hereinafter CEDAW]; 
Convention  against  Torture  and  Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or 
Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, art. 17 [hereinafter CAT]; Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
25. See ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 17(1) at 9 (requiring state parties to furnish reports 
during their first year in stages and in accordance with the Council).  Interestingly, during 
the “finishing touches” stage in 1966, the year the ICESCR was promulgated, the United 
States  proposed  the  establishment  of  an  independent  Committee  similar  to  the  Human 
Rights Committee, and the Soviet Union rejected the proposal.  See Philip Alston, Out of the 
Abyss:  The  Challenges  Confronting  the  New  U.N.  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural  Rights, 9  HUM.  RTS.  Q.  332,  338-339  (1987)  [hereinafter  Alston,  Challenges] 
(presenting arguments in support and in opposition to the creation of the Committee).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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and methods.  Thus, the Committee is the only one of the six major UN 
human rights treaty bodies that was not created by the terms of the human 
rights treaty it monitors.
In  fact,  the  Committee  is  the  third  entity  the  General  Assembly  has 
created to  monitor  the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social and
Cultural Rights; it was established in 1985 when the first two bodies, called 
the  Sessional  Working  Group  and  the  Sessional  Working  Group  of 
Governmental  Experts,  were  abandoned  for  ineffectiveness.
26  These 
bodies’ impressive shortcomings included their eight-year long failure to 
comment substantively on any state’s report.
27
These  groups  also  alienated  the  specialized  agencies,  particularly  the 
International  Labour  Organization  (ILO),
28  whose  cooperation  with  the 
Committee is particularly crucial given the extensive treatment of labor 
rights in the Covenant.
29
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) created the Committee by 
resolution.
30  The  Committee  consists  of  18  “experts  with  recognized 
competence  in  the  field  of  human  rights,  serving  in  their  personal 
capacity.”
31 ECOSOC elects nine members every two years, for a four year 
term.
32 The Committee first convened in 1987.
33
III. THE COMMITTEE’S RECORD
The Committee has had more than fifteen years to define its priorities 
26. See, e.g., Alston, Challenges, supra note 25, at 340-42; International Comm’n of 
Jurists,  UN  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights, 42  INT’L  COMM’N  OF 
JURISTS REV. 33, 33 (1989) (illustrating the process of evolution from the working group to 
a committee of independent experts).
27. See  Alston,  Challenges,  supra  note  25,  at  341-42  (listing  the  findings  of  the 
Commission of Jurists survey of the Sessional Working Group).
28. Id. at 365-67.
29. See  MATTHEW  CRAVEN,  THE  INTERNATIONAL  COVENANT  ON  ECONOMIC,  SOCIAL 
AND  CULTURAL  RIGHTS:  A  PERSPECTIVE  ON  ITS  DEVELOPMENT  36  (1995)  [hereinafter 
INTERNATIONAL  COVENANT]  (quoting  Philip  Alston,  The  UN  Specialised  Agencies  and 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 79 (1979)).
30. E.S.C.  Res.  1985/17,  U.N.  ESCOR,  Supp.  No.  1,  at  15,  U.N.  Doc.  E/1985/85 
(1985).
31. Id.
32. Id. The Committee members elect their own officers, for two year terms. Rules of Procedure 
of the Committee: .01/09/93. E/C.12/1990/4/Rev.1 (Basic Reference Document) (1993), at Rule 15.
33. For  helpful  contemporaneous  accounts of  the  Committee’s  early  operations,  see
Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 (1987); Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, Second 
Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 
603  (1987);  Scott  Leckie,  An  Overview  and  Appraisal  of  the  Fifth  Session  of  the  UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 539 (1991).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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and establish its methods.  The general consensus is that the Committee has 
used  relatively  scant  financial  and  political  resources  to  good  effect,
34
rapidly  bringing  the  ICESCR  Covenant’s  monitoring  processes  up  to 
current  treaty  body  standards,  advancing  its  own  political  fortunes,  and 
gaining greater general acceptance for the justiciability of economic, social 
and cultural rights through careful attention to norm development.
A. Improvement and Entrenchment of the Monitoring Processes
The  new  Committee  stepped  into  a  failed  monitoring  system,  and, 
relatively free from procedural mandates,
35 set about inventing a process 
that would engage the States Parties and revive interest in economic, social 
and  cultural  rights.
36    By  learning  from  the  experiences  of  the  existing 
treaty  bodies,  creatively  interpreting  its  mandate,  and  consistently 
undertaking broader normative initiatives, the Committee quietly brought 
the Covenant’s enforcement processes into line with the other UN human 
rights treaties.  In fact, according to a recent report on the methods of the 
six treaty monitoring bodies, the Committee has moved beyond standard 
practice in many respects.
1. Leveraging Slim Resources
Professor Anne Bayefsky’s 2001 in-depth evaluation of the UN human 
rights  monitoring  system
37  provides  insight  into  the  Committee’s 
34. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 102-3; ARAMBULO, supra 
note 12, at 39; Leckie, supra note 33, at 546-47; John Foster, Meeting the Challenges: 
Renewing the Progress of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNIV. N.B. L.REV. 197, 
200 (1998); Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the 
Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
161, 187 (1998).
35. See INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 50 (stating that the Committee 
has had the power to shape its practices “in an unprecedented manner”).  For example, the 
ICESCR  requires  only  that  the  States  Parties  submit  reports  “in  accordance  with  a 
programme to be established by the Economic and Social Council,” ICESCR, supra note 17, 
art. 17.1.  Only the ICCPR affords similar flexibility.  ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 40.  The 
other four in-force UN human rights treaties specify the periodicity, giving their monitors 
less autonomy in crafting their own solutions to the difficult problems of overdue reports 
and backlogs. See ICERD, supra note 24, art. 9.1 (requiring reports one year after entry and 
every two years there after); CEDAW, supra note 24, art. 18.1 (requiring reports one year 
after entry into force and at least every four years there after); CAT, supra note 24, art. 19.1 
(requiring reports one year after entry into force and every four years after); CRC, supra
note 24, art. 44.1 (requiring reports two years after entry into force and every five years 
there after).
36. See Philip Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 332, 356-62 (1987) 
(discussing contemporaneously the Committee’s earliest planning processes).
37. ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT 
THE CROSSROADS 2 (2001).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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procedural  achievements  and  shortcomings.    The  report  reveals  that  by 
most  indicators  the  Committee  has  achieved  parity  with  the  other 
monitoring bodies, despite being one of the lower resourced bodies.
38
Monitoring  economic,  social  and  cultural  rights  is  arguably  more 
resource  intensive  than  monitoring  civil  and  political  rights,  because 
ESCRs implicate inter-disciplinary information that is maintained outside 
the customary “justice” framework.
39 Although the CESCR is not the only 
UN human rights body that deals with economic, social and cultural rights, 
it is the only body that deals exclusively with them.  The Committee on the 
Elimination  of  Racial  Discrimination  (CERD),  the  Committee  on  the 
Rights  of  the  Child  (CRC)  and  Committee  on  the  Elimination  of 
Discrimination  Against  Women  (CEDAW)  deal  with  ESCRs
40  and  thus 
inter-disciplinary  issues,  creating  greater  information  gathering  and 
synthesis  demands.  UNICEF  and  UNIFEM,  which  can  be  considered 
“parallel” agencies to the CRC and CEDAW, have decided that the human 
rights  implementation  work  falls  within  their  mandates,  and  they  have 
undertaken supportive roles with their “counterpart” human rights bodies.
41
UNICEF’s support to the CRC is particularly significant.
42 As a result, the 
CRC has more staff members than other monitoring bodies, and a strong 
network of NGOs supported by UNICEF, which participates in the CRC’s 
work.
43
Meanwhile, the UN agency arguably most likely to be cast in the role of 
a CESCR “counterpart” is the UNDP, and the UNDP has proven to be 
much  more  cautious  about  becoming  involved  with  human  rights 
monitoring,  and  the  Committee  has  not  enjoyed  significant  UNDP 
38. Id. at 99 (mentioning that the Committee is among the three committees that offer 
no remuneration to its members).  This information must be taken in comparative context; 
however,  the  three  treaty  bodies  that  do  compensate  their  members  (the  Human  Rights 
Committee (HRC), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)) pay only $3000-$5000 per 
year to their members.  Id.
39. See ICESCR, supra note 16, arts. 18-23 (acknowledging the importance of the UN 
specialized agencies to monitoring and implementing economic, social and cultural rights, 
and  anticipating  extensive  cooperation  between  the  Committee  and  the  specialized 
agencies).
40. See, e.g., ICERD, supra note 24, art. 2(2) (noting “special measures”/affirmative 
action); 5(e) (explaining non-discrimination in a range of ESCRs); CRC, supra note 24, arts. 
24, 26-29, 32; CEDAW, supra note 24, art. 3 (noting “all appropriate measures”/affirmative 
action); id. arts. 10-13, 16 (indicating non-discrimination in a range of economic and social 
services); id. art. 14.2 (mandating a range of economic and social services for rural women).
41. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 39, 43, 49, 62.
42. See id.
43. See id. (suggesting that there does not appear to be any literature examining whether 
and how a close relationship with an agency might compromise a treaty monitoring body’s 
independence).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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support.
44 Another example of limited resources is that the CESCR also has 
a smaller complement of secretariat support staff because of its status as a 
non-treaty-based body.
45
2.  General Procedures and Progressive Monitoring Methodologies
In  the  Bayefsky  report,  the  Committee  receives  generally  favorable 
marks  vis-à-vis  the  other  committees  for  its  reporting  practices.
46  The 
Committee requires that from the time of consideration of a state’s first 
report, reports be submitted every five years, unless the Committee decides 
to shorten the period based on factors such as the quality of the most recent 
dialogue.
47 This periodicity is in line with the other bodies, whose spacing 
reflects a variety of arrangements, including two years
48 and five years.
49
The Human Rights Committee sets no specific period, retaining the ability 
to set the timing for each member governments.
50 Like the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) and the Committee Against Torture (CAT), the 
CESCR has a two-year reporting backlog.
51
All  treaty  monitoring  regimes  suffer  from  a  significant  numbers  of 
overdue reports.
52 As of 2001, the Committee had 164 overdue reports, 
falling in the middle of the situation of all the treaty bodies, which range 
from 106-397.
53 Although its numbers are relatively low, the Committee 
has the highest percentage of States Parties with overdue reports.
54 CERD 
routinely considers states’ practices in the absence of a report, and CESCR, 
along with the HRC, is following suit.
55 The Bayefsky report notes that the 
44. See id. at 49 (noting that “UNDP can be said to have a growing belief – still largely 
theoretical – in the centrality of the treaty standards, and their implementation, to their 
work.”) (emphasis added).
45. Craven, Committee, supra note 14, at 461.
46. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 223-236. 
47. ICESCR, supra note 16, art. 17.1; E.S.C. Res. 1988/4, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1 at 
Rule 58.2; CESCR Resolution, at III (2000).
48. ICERD, supra note 24, art. 9.1.
49. CRC, supra note 24, art. 44.1 (noting the period to be 5 years); CEDAW, supra
note 24, at 18.1(b) (explaining that the period is 4 years).
50. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 40.1(b).
51. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 16.
52. See id. at 8-11, 469 - 502.
53. Id. at 472.
54. Id. at 475.
55. See id. at 12; see, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Togo, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 26th mtg. ¶¶ 3, 17, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.61 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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Committee is only body that sometimes fails to provide information in its 
annual reports on the due date of the states’ overdue reports.
56
The Committee’s procedures make it open to civil society participation. 
Beginning in 1987 it accepted written and oral submissions by NGOs.
57 In 
1993 it established a formal procedure for NGO participation.
58 Currently it 
is one of four monitoring bodies that holds a “pre-sessional working group” 
to generate the list of issues for states to answer and to encourage NGO 
input.
59  The  Committee  entertains  NGO  presentations  in  open  meetings 
both at its pre-sessional working group sessions and on the first day of the 
session.
60  The  Committee  benefits  from  the  significant  involvement  of 
international NGOs who dedicate resources to activating and supporting 
domestic NGOs to participate in Committee processes through “shadow” or 
“parallel”  NGO  reports  and  verbal  interventions.
61  The  Committee  also 
consults with NGOs in preparation for drafting its General Comments.
and Cultural Rights: Republic of the Congo, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 22d mtg. ¶¶ 3, 24, 
U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.45  (2000);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Solomon Islands, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 24th 
mtg. ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.33 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, U.N. ESCOR, 
17th Sess., 45th mtg. ¶¶ 3, 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.21 (1997); Concluding Observations 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Guinea, U.N. ESCOR, 14th 
Sess., 22d mtg. ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.5 (1996); Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Mali, U.N. ESCOR, 11th Sess., 44th 
mtg. ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/17 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Mauritius, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 23d mtg. ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/8 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, 
Social  and  Cultural  Rights:  Kenya,  U.N.  ESCOR,  8th  Sess.,  19th  mtg.  ¶  2,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1993/6  (1993).  The  Bayefsky  report  endorses  consideration  in  the  absence  of  a 
report in some instances. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 13.
56. See Bayefsky, supra note 37, at 114, 120.
57. Virginia  Dandan,  The  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights and 
Non-Governmental  Organizations,  in THE  UN  HUMAN  RIGHTS  SYSTEM  IN  THE  21ST 
CENTURY 227, 228 (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000).
58. See id. at 229.
59. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 29.
60. Id. at 43.
61. See, e.g., Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Using the UN Committee for 
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  (2001),  available  at
http://www.cohre.org/unframe.htm;  Foodfirst  Information  Action  Network,  at 
http://www.fian.org  (providing  a  mission  description).  Other  NGOs  that  have  offered 
sustained,  active  support  to  the  Committee  include  the  American  Association  for  the 
Advancement of Science, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Habitat 
International  Coalition,  Human  Rights  Information  and  Documentation  Systems, 
International,  the  International  Human  Rights  Internship  Program,  and  the  International 
Commission  of  Jurists.  See,  e.g.,  ALLAN  MCCHESNEY,  PROMOTING  AND  DEFENDING 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL  RIGHTS:  A HANDBOOK 165 (2000); ASIAN FORUM  FOR 
HUMAN  RIGHTS  AND  DEVELOPMENT  AND INTERNATIONAL  HUMAN  RIGHTS  INTERNSHIP 
PROGRAM, CIRCLE  OF  RIGHTS:  ECONOMIC,  SOCIAL  &  CULTURAL  RIGHTS  ACTIVISM:  A 
TRAINING RESOURCE (2000); Dandan, supra note 57, at 229. Recently, the International 
Women’s Rights  Action Watch  (IWRAW), a group primarily  focused on CEDAW, has 
begun to participate in Committee hearings as well.  Dandan, supra note 57, at 229.3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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The Committee has been relatively activist in responding to emergency 
situations  and  engaging  in  follow-up  activities.    It  has  undertaken  two 
official missions, as many as CERD and more than the other monitoring 
bodies.
62  The  Committee  is  one  of  only  two  committees  that  currently 
publishes information and conducts dialogues with States Parties between 
formal  sessions,
63  and  the  only  one  that  has  published  procedures  for 
solicitation of additional information.
64
3. Information Sharing Practices
Concluding Observations are the document in which a monitoring body 
comments on individual States’ Party implementation of the relevant treaty.  
In its Concluding Observations, the Committee is one of three bodies that 
separate  concerns  from  recommendations,  a  practice  endorsed  in  the 
Bayefsky report as strengthening the recommendations.
65 The Committee 
receives  endorsement  for  being  one  of  three  Committees  whose  annual 
reports lists the NGOs that participated in its proceedings,
66 one of four that 
lists reports received from states,
67 and one of three that always provides 
lists of reports that have been considered.
68 The report also endorses the 
Committee  for  being  the  only  monitoring  body  that  directly  documents 
follow-up activities to consideration of states’ reports,
69 as well as for being 
the only body that routinely provides information on its working methods.
70
The  report  also  critiques  some  of  the  Committee’s  reporting 
methodologies, noting that the Committee is one of four monitoring bodies 
that do not reproduce comments received from governments on concluding 
observations
71 and one of only two that do not refer to the existence of such 
responses at all.
72 The Committee is one of three bodies that do not provide 
the names of the country rapporteurs,
73 and one of three that publish no 
information  regarding  the activities  of  the  committee  members  between 
62. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 92-93.
63. See id. at 73.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 63.
66. See id. at 113.
67. See id.
68. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 113.
69. See id. at 113, 119-120.
70. See id. at 113, 119.
71. See id. at 113.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 113, 119.3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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sessions.
74  The  Committee  is  one  of  five  committees  that  decided  to 
discontinue publishing a summary of its dialogue with governments.
75 The 
Committee receives relatively high marks from the report for the quantity 
of information accessible through the Internet.
76
4. Bias
The Bayefsky report documents a lack of even treatment of similarly 
situated  states  in  all  the  monitoring  bodies’  concluding  observations.
77
Bayefsky  negatively  refers  to the  Committee’s  decision to interact  with 
Israel between sessions.
78
The Bayefsky report points out many factors contributing to political 
bias in all the treaty bodies,
79 including the fact that that membership on a 
monitoring body is a part-time occupation,
80 and also that at least of 48% of 
the  members  serving  on  the  committees  have  been  “employed  in  some 
capacity by their governments.”
81 This raises particularly direct and explicit 
concerns about the politicization of the CERD,
82 but also raise concerns 
about the CESCR as well.  The CESCR and the other three committees that 
do  not  consider  individual  complaints  have  the  highest  percentage  of 
government employee members.
83
The report notes that other committees are in the forefront in creating 
mechanisms to ensure equitable geographical distribution in its leadership 
and  subgroupings  (such  as,  for  example,  membership  on  pre-sessional 
working groups), an issue of particular interest in a post-colonial analysis.
84
An  analysis  of  committee  memberships  reveals  that  the  Committee 
currently has the highest percentage of “tri-continental” members amongst 
74. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 113.
75. Id.  at  113.  CEDAW  is  the  only  body  that  provides  any  record  of  the  oral 
discussions, and it publishes only a summary of the government’s opening statement, which 
is critiqued as “add[ing] very little to the written record.”  Id.
76. See id. at 122-23 (listing documents that should be added to the web; for CESCR, 
the only omission noted is the list of biographical information for candidates to Committee 
membership).
77. See id. at 63 (stating that “political bias is sometimes evident in the differential 
depth of treatment of some states”) (parenthetical omitted).
78. See id. at 73 (discussing the first instance of the committee’s using new procedures 
for additional information requests).
79. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 99-102.
80. Id. at 99.
81. Id. at 100.
82. See  id.  at  63  (stating  that  “the  absence  of  discernable  factual  grounds  for  the 
differential treatment . . . is most evident in the concluding observations of CERD”).
83. Id. at 100.
84. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 101.3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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all the committees.  The Committee has had four Chairpersons: Ibrahim Ali 
Badawi El Sheikh (1987-1990, Egypt), Valeri I. Kouznetsov (1990-1991, 
Russian  Federation),  Philip  Alston  (1991-1998,  Australia)  and  Virginia 
Bonoan-Dandan (1999-present, Philippines).  The CESCR is also one of 
four committees whose membership includes fewer than twenty percent 
women.
85
B. Contributions To Justiciability
The Committee has worked hard to rescue economic, social and cultural 
rights from historical and political obscurity, and to overcome the non-
justiciability critique that bedevils this body of rights.  The Committee’s 
efforts include development of the norms contained within the Covenant, 
elaboration  of  a  draft  option  protocol  for  an  individual  complaints 
mechanism, promotion of progressive pronouncements by the UN Charter-
based bodies, and attention to domestic justiciability.
1. Norm Development
The Committee focused early efforts on establishing that the Covenant 
does  contain  immediately  enforceable  obligations.    Its  first  General 
Comment, issued in 1989, discussed the importance of “specific bench-
marks”  to  the  evaluation  of  States  Parties’  progress.
86  Its  third  General 
Comment was entitled “The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Article 
2(1), Paragraph I, of the Covenant).”
87 In this document the Committee laid 
out an interpretation of Article 2(1) that made a strong case for the duty to 
take immediate action on all the Covenant provisions,
88 and the duty to 
immediately implement several of the Covenant obligations.
89
85. Id.  The two Committees with higher female representation are the CEDAW and the 
CRC. Id.
86. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 1 
–  Reporting  by  states  parties,  in  Compilation  of  General  Comments  and  General 
Recommendations  Adopted  by  Human  Rights  Treaty  Bodies,  3d  Sess.,  U.N.  Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 14, ¶¶ 6-7 (2001).
87. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3 
- The nature of States parties’ obligations (art. 2, ¶ 1, of the Covenant), in Compilation of 
General  Comments  and  General  Recommendations  Adopted  by  Human  Rights  Treaty 
Bodies,  5th  Sess.,  U.N.  Doc.  HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5,  at 
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/epcomm3.htm  (2001)  [hereinafter  General  Comment 
No. 3].
88. See id. at  www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/epcomm3.htm ¶¶  2 & 9. See also 
CRAVEN, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 128 (saying that “states therefore 
cannot make do with rights ‘on the cheap.’”).  Check this. 
89. General  Comment  No.  3,  supra  note  87,  at  18  (2001).    See  also  CRAVEN, 
INTERNATIONAL  COVENANT,  supra  note  29,  at  135  (suggesting  articles  3,  18,  13(3)  and 
15(3)).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
16 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 10:3
The Committee’s General Comments are its most important contribution 
to the elaboration of the substantive provisions of the Covenant.
90 Most of 
the General Comments contain detailed discussions about the content of 





94  Two  of  the  General  Comments  center  on  vulnerable 
populations: persons with disabilities
95 and older persons.
96 One General 
Comment examines the issue of economic sanctions.
97
2. Optional Protocol
Perhaps the most powerful indicator of justiciability is the opportunity 
for individuals to vindicate their rights through a complaints process.  The 
Committee has been working to promote the promulgation of an optional 
protocol to the Covenant to establish such a procedure.  Currently amongst 
90. See generally Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001).
91. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 4 - The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), in Compilation of 
General  Comments  and  General  Recommendations  Adopted  by  Human  Rights  Treaty 
Bodies,  6th  Sess.,  U.N.  Doc.  HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5,  at  22  (2001);  U.N.  Committee  on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7 - The right to adequate 
housing  (art.  11  (1)  of  the  Covenant):  forced  evictions,  in  Compilation  of  General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 16th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 49 (2001) [hereinafter General Comment 7].
92. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No.  11  -  Plans  of  action  for  primary  education  (art.  14),  in  Compilation  of  General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 20th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 63 (2001); U.N. Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights,  General  Comment  No.  13  -  The  right  to  education  (art.  13),  in
Compilation  of  General  Comments  and  General  Recommendations  Adopted  by  Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 74 (2001).
93. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 12 - The right to adequate food (art. 11), in Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 66 (2001).
94. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 14 - The right to the highest attainable standard of health (art. 12), in Compilation of 
General  Comments  and  General  Recommendations  Adopted  by  Human  Rights  Treaty 
Bodies, 22d Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 90 (2001).
95. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No.  5  –  Persons  with  disabilities,  in  Compilation  of  General  Comments  and  General 
Recommendations  Adopted  by  Human  Rights  Treaty  Bodies,  11th  Sess.,  U.N.  Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 28 (2001).
96. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 6 – The economic, social and cultural rights of older persons, in Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 13th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 38 (2001).
97. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 8 – The relationship of economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural 
rights, in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 54 (2001).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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the UN monitoring bodies, the HRC, CAT, CERD and CEDAW decide 
contentious petitions.
98 In 1997, after extensive consultations in Committee 
sessions and at the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights,
99 the Committee 
submitted a draft optional protocol to the Commission on Human Rights.
100
However,  to  date  the  Commission  has  used  dilatory  tactics  to  stall  the 
measure,  repeatedly  returning  the  issue  to  the  Secretariat  for  further 
discussions  and  clarifications  despite  the  fact  that  relatively  few 
governments have even chosen to comment on the draft.
101 In 2001, the UN 
High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  held  an  expert  consultation 
“directed  to  working  through  remaining  issues  and  obstacles  to  the 
adoption  [of  the  Protocol],”
102  which  demonstrates  that  the  Committee 
remains committed to pressing for this important implementation measure.  
The  Committee  has  also  consistently  used  the  reporting  process  to 
encourage governments to support the optional protocol.
103
3.  Domestic Enforcement
In  addition  to  its  nascent  follow-up  procedures  and  missions,  the 
Committee  has  also  worked  for  domestic  enforcement  of  the  Covenant 
through attention to the legal status of ESCRs at the national level.  Its 
ninth General Comment, “The Domestic Application of the Covenant,
104
98. See  Andrew  Byrnes,  An  Effective  Complaints  Procedure  in  the  Context  of 
International Human Rights Law, in THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY
139, 140 (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000) (remarking on HRC, CAT & CERD contentious case 
jurisdiction);  Optional  Protocol  to  the  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  Discrimination 
against  Women,  U.N.  Doc.  G/A  Res.  A/54/4  (October  6,  1999)  (noting  CEDAW 
contentious case jurisdiction).
99. For a detailed description of the reasoning and conclusions reached at Utrecht, see 
ARAMBULO, supra note 12, at 201-357.
100. Id. at 160 (citing Report of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
to the Commission on Human Rights on a Draft Optional Protocol for the Consideration of 
Communications  Concerning  Non-Compliance  with  the  International  Covenant  on 
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights, U.N.  Doc.  E/CN.4/1997/105  (18  Dec.  1996),  5 
International Human Rights Reports (1998)).
101. See id. at 161-162.
102. See Workshop on the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, With 
Particular  Reference  to  an  Optional Protocol  to  the  Covenant on  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural  Rights  (Palais  Wilson,  5-6  Feb.  2001),  at  http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/ 
escrwkshop.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2002).  
103. See,  e.g., Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural  Rights:  Germany,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  58th  mtg.  at  ¶  4,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.68  (2001)  (praising  change  of  position  vis-à-vis  the  Optional  Protocol); 
Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights: 
Mexico, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41 (1999) (praising position 
on Optional Protocol).
104. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 9 –
The  Domestic  Application  of  the  Covenant,  in  Compilation  of  General  Comments  and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. 3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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reiterates  its  earlier  justiciability  interpretations  and  sets  forth  the 
international law requirements mandating recognition of the Covenant as 
binding law in the domestic legal order of States Parties.
105 The Committee 
tracks this issue in the reporting process as well.
106
IV. “POST-COLONIAL” IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE’S WORK
The  following  analysis  of  the  Committee’s  work  highlights  aspects 
relevant to three themes found in the literature of post-colonial theory and 
expressed at the conference for which this article was produced.  Post-
colonial theorists work to: 1) explore the problematic historical legacy of 
modern international intervention in the developing world, 2) expose the 
currently discriminatory aspects of international action vis-à-vis southern 
states, and 3) give voice to the most oppressed people.
107 The Committee’s 
work is responsive to these concerns in that its message to the developing 
world often contradicts that of the international financial community, and 
because  its  reporting  procedure  jurisprudence  has  reflected  a  relatively 
even-handed  treatment  of  north  and  south.    At  the  same  time,  the 
Committee  cannot  escape  some  long-standing  criticisms  of  the  human 
rights regime in that it condemns certain cultural customs, and that it has 
insuf ficient resources to ensure the participation and follow -up that would 
make its work meaningful to the most disenfranchised of the millions of 
people who are supposed to be affected by its mandate.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 58 (2001).
105. Id. at 59 ¶ 4.
106. See,  e.g., Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural Rights: Armenia, 21st Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.39 (1999) 
(reporting  a  failure  to  clarify  status  of  the  covenant  under  Armenian  law);  Concluding 
Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights:  Iceland, 20th 
Sess., 20th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.32 (1999) (noting a certain complacency 
with respect to the non-incorporation of the Covenant in domestic legislation); Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Bulgaria, 21st 
Sess., 50th-51st mtg. at ¶¶ 34, 36, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.37 (1999) (requesting the state 
party to ensure the wide dissemination of Covenant and Concluding Observations).
107. These are of necessity imaginarily concrete post-colonial “concerns.” As a branch 
of post-modernism, post-coloniality does not lend itself to the absolutes that drive human 
rights  discourse.  “Indeterminacy  seems  to  abide  forever.    Postcoloniality  is,  for  some, 
whatever you want to make of it that will allow individual compromises and opportunisms 
to flourish.”  E. SAN JUAN, JR., BEYOND POSTCOLONIAL THEORY 2 (1998).  Similar concerns 
have  been  registered  by  writers  attempting  to  reconcile  the  “static  character”  of  human 
rights language with the discourse of international development, in which “[a]ll is up for 
reconsideration as contexts and possibilities change.” Henry J. Steiner, Social Rights and 
Economic Development: Converging Discourses?, 4 BUFF. H. RTS. L. REV. 25, 41 (1998). 
See also UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000 
19 (2000).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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A. De-Mining the Social Spending Arena
One  of  the  primary  projects  of  postcolonial  theory  is  to  examine 
colonialism and show the extent to which modern arrangements remain 
colonial  in  origins  and  effect.
108  Many  scholars  have  also  taken  up  the 
specific  project  of  exposing  the  colonial  and  racist  historical  roots  of 
contemporary international law,
109 international law reform,
110 international 
human rights,
111 and international financial institutions.
112 This literature 
provides a rich source for constructing the Committee’s colonial “legacy.” 
The Committee’s subject matter implies a unique legacy, one that holds 
lessons for the Committee’s future methods and priorities.
Specifically,  the  work  of  examining  developing  countries’ 
macroeconomic  and  social  spending  policies  places  international 
Committee  squarely  in  a  realm  where  post-colonial  north-on-south 
inte r vention  and  manipulation  have  been  perhaps  the  most  blatant  and 
comprehensive.
113  Colonialism  was  to  a  great  extent  an  extractive 
108. See  LEELA  GANDHI,  POSTCOLONIAL  THEORY:  A  CRITICAL  INTRODUCTION  7-8 
(1998); YOUNG, supra note 4, at 4.
109. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth-Century  International  Law,  40  HARV.  INT’L  L.J.  1,  10-22  (1999).    See  also
Annelise  Riles,  The  View  from  the  International  Plane:  Perspective  and  Scale  in  the 
Architecture of Colonial International Law, in LAWS  OF  THE POSTCOLONIAL 127, 127-38 
(Eve Darian-Smith and Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999).
110. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance 
in Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887, 904-08 (2000); Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed 
States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L  L. & POL’Y 903, 926-46 
(1997); Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-
Outsider, 45 VILL. L. REV. 841, 851 (2000); see Padideh Ala’i, The Legacy of Geographical 
Morality  and  Colonialism:  A  Historical  Assessment  of  the  Current  Crusade  Against 
Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 877, 909-29 (2000); see also YOUNG, supra note 
108, at 59.
111. See Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 589, 597, 
617 (1996); Riles, supra note 109, at 131; Fitzpatrick & Darian-Smith, supra note 2, at 1, 
10.
112. See  Padideh  Ala’i,  A  Human  Rights  Critique  of  the  WTO:  Some  Preliminary 
Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. REV. 537, 540 (2001); see also Antony Anghie, 
Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the 
Third  World, 32  N.Y.U.  J.  INT’L  L.  POL.  243,  253  (2000)  [hereinafter  Anghie, 
Globalization,  IFIs  and  the  Third  World]  (noting  that  World  Bank  and  International 
Monetary Fund programs sometimes violate social and economic rights); Jeannine Purdy, 
Postcolonialism: The Emperor’s New Clothes?, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 212-13 (Eve 
Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999) (noting that violence in Trinidad and Tobago 
coincided with International Monetary Fund intervention); Dianne Otto, Subalternity and 
International  Law:  The  Problems  of  Global  Community  and  the  Incommensurability  of 
Difference, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 155 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 
1999) (suggesting that the establishment of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was an effort by western interests to keep 
economic “questions” away from the control of the United Nations General Assembly).
113. See PANOS MOURDOUKOUTAS, THE GLOBAL CORPORATION: THE DECOLONIZATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 19 (1999) (noting that many historians and economists support 
the notion that the colonial period was an extractive enterprise dedicated to making the raw 
human  and  material  resources  of  the  colonized  world  available  to  the  colonizing 3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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enterprise dedicated to making the raw human and material resources of the 
colonized world available to the colonizing economies.
114 The period 1875-
1947 was characterized by falling transport costs, “physical integration of 
world markets”
115 and the expansion of international law.
116  As a result, 
the  period  1913-1947  was  an  age  of  economic  “multinationalism,” 
involving  low  trade  barriers  and  “weak  government.”
117    The  colonial 
powers used their control over southern government functions to achieve 
international  economic  integration.    Concurrent  with  relinquishment  of 
direct  political  control  over  the  African  and  Asian  colonies,  the 
multinational corporation arose
118 and facilitated continuing action in the 
global south by northern-controlled business interests, despite the increased 
trade  barriers  and  diversity  of  trading  partners  that  characterized  the 
immediate post-colonial period.
119
The  implication  is  that  extraction  has  continued  unabated.  Certainly 
there is little evidence that the colonial powers devoted serious attention or 
resources to poverty reduction or general welfare measures in the colonies 
until shortly before decolonization.
120
The trade and power imbalance the former colonies brought to the new 
dynamic  did  not  go  unremarked.    The  global  south  banded  together  to 
sponsor  a  series  of  initiatives  in  the  United  Nations  urging  that  the 
economies).  The height of the colonial period, 1875-1947, was a period characterized by 
falling transport costs and “physical integration of world markets.”  Id.
114. See, e.g., FIELDHOUSE, supra note 4, at 75, 77, 81-82 (noting aspects of colonial rule 
such as low attention to colonial affairs by the larger colonizing governments and belated 
attention  to  ameliorative  development  measures  as  opposed  to  resource  extraction  and 
corporate  interests).  Fieldhouse  also  provides  a  useful  survey  of  the  integrated  world 
economy “optimists,” id. at 9, and “pessimists,” id. at 32.  Marx termed colonialism as 
Europe’s period of “primitive accumulation.”  Id. at 42-43 (quoting KARL MARX, CAPITAL
751 (1867)).  See also Catherine Couquery Vidrovitch, Les Conditions de la Dépendance: 
Histoire  de  Sous-Developpement,  in  DECOLONISATIONS  &  NOUVELLES  DEPENDANCES: 
MODELES  ET  CONTRE-MODELES  IDEOLOGIQUES  ET  CUTURELS  DANS  LE  TIERS-MONDE  33 
(Catherine Couquery Vidrovitch & Alain Forest eds., 1986) (rooting colonialism’s legacy in 
the “économie de pillage”).
115. MOURDOUKOUTAS,  supra  note  113,  at  19.    This  integration  included  the  forced 
introduction  of  inappropriate  technologies  and  commodification  of  national  resources.  
TRAN  VAN  DINH,  INDEPENDENCE,  LIBERATION,  REVOLUTION:  AN  APPROACH  TO  THE 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE THIRD WORLD 211 (1987).
116. See  Riles,  supra  note  109,  at  129  (describing  a  “flurry  of  activity”  to  develop 
international law in the late nineteenth century).
117. MOURDOUKOUTAS, supra note 113, at 16.
118. See FIELDHOUSE, supra note 4, at 256 (noting “the great leap forwards” in foreign 
direct investment after the second world war).
119. Id. at 35-38. See also YOUNG, supra note 108, at 47 (arguing that trade agreements 
and the western dominated IFIs, inter alia, “all [had] the effect of maintaining control”).
120. See, e.g., FIELDHOUSE, supra note 4, at 86 (noting that the British empire’s first 
attempt to underwrite domestic poverty-reducing expenditures took place in 1940). But see 
FIELDHOUSE,  supra  note  4,  at  317  (stating  that  Japan  made  significant  investments  into 
Taiwanese and Korean education and health care).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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independence-era vision of trade between equals be made reality. Political 
battles broke out over the rights of multinationals with respect to their host 
developing country governments.  The New International Economic Order, 
or N.I.E.O., was formally adopted by the UN in a series of resolutions in 
1974 and 1975.
121 It came to represent a bundle of southern government 
actions  that  included  increased  trade  barriers  and  expropriation  of 
multinational assets at the national level, along with the fight for increased 
north-south trade concessions and aid at the international level.
122
Another key feature of post-war north-south economic relations was the 
international financial institutions (IFIs), most importantly the International 
Monetary  Fund  and  the  World  Bank.  These  institutions  have  actively 
sought  macroeconomic  reform  across  the  global  south,  reform  that 
facilitates  the  operations  of  multinational  corporations  and  international 
trade.
123  These  agencies  have  also  routinely  advocated  that  southern 
governments reduce their social spending and re-tool production to service 
international  markets,  policies  that  have  been  widely  condemned  for 
producing high social costs, particularly in the short term.
124
Thus  the  Committee  is  treading  on  sensitive  historical  ground  to  the 
extent that it assigns “blame” for poverty on poor governments. If the true 
value  added  of  any  supranational  institution  is  to  identify  and  provide 
support for replication of best practices, what does it mean for a country to 
slash its social welfare system by IMF mandate, engage in big development 
121. See  DINH,  supra  note  115,  at  203;  Philip  Alston,  The  Basic  Working  Paper: 
Development and the Rule of Law: Prevention versus Cure as a Human Rights Strategy, in
DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 31, 83 (1981) [hereinafter Alston, 
Development and the Rule of Law].
122. See  Douglas  Williams,  Human  Rights  and  Economic  Development,  in HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 26, 27 (1978).
123. See Anghie, Globalization, IFIs, and the Third World, supra note 112, at 257-258.
124. See, e.g., The IMF Formula: Prescription for Poverty, in INTERNATIONAL FORUM 
ON  GLOBALIZATION,  IFG  BULLETIN,  Volume  1,  Issue  1,  8  (2001)  (excerpted  from 
INTERNATIONAL  FORUM  ON  GLOBALIZATION,  DOES  GLOBALIZATION  HELP  THE  POOR?
(2001)).  See also Enrique R. Carrasco & M. Ayhan Kose, Income Distribution and the 
Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social Development, 6 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 31 & n.177 (1996) (noting that some IMF reports 
have criticized Structural Adjustment Programs (SSAPs)).  The social critique of structural 
adjustment is by no means uncontroversial.  Id.  Carrasco and Kose argue that claims of 
worsened income distribution resulting from SSAPs are “only partially borne out,” while 
also noting the World Bank’s own recent publications on poverty and growing civil society 
attention to scrutinizing the IFIs.  Id. at 31-32.  Interestingly, when the World Bank issued a 
comprehensive report on poverty, stories surfaced about last minute revisions to the text 
owing to struggles over how to portray the impact of market oriented reforms on poverty.  
See,  e.g.,  James  Cox,  Poor  Nations  Just  Getting  Poorer:  Controversial  Poverty  Report 
Urges Growth and Equality, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2000, at 5B; Steven Pearlstein, World 
Bank Rethinks Poverty; Report Finds Traditional Approach Fails, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 
2000, at E1.  Reportedly, the chief author of the report resigned after U.S. and European 
officials reportedly demanded that he put more emphasis on economic growth and free-
market policies as ways to alleviate poverty.  See Cox, supra note 124.3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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projects at the urging of the World Bank, and lower trade barriers pursuant 
to the WTO, only be condemned by a UN human rights committee for any 
resulting intensification of hunger, ill health and displacement? And in this 
context, how can the international human rights community constructively 
identify  and  address  the  very  real  contributions  to  poverty  by  national 
governments?
The Committee has found some satisfactory answers to these questions.  
First, it has been critical of IFI policies and interventions. The Committee 
has begun to engage the IFIs and to work  more closely with its States 
Parties to counter to the liberal international financial mandate enforced 
throughout  the  international  community.    The  Committee  is  urged  to 
continue and expand this mandate, to maximize appropriate attention to 
poverty alleviation by international financial institutions and corporations, 
the bodies that have been called the “loci of real power exertion.”
125
1. Committee’s Statements on Globalization
The Committee’s limited interventions into the debate on globalization 
and  structural  adjustment  are,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  northern 
countries, its most controversial work.
126 The northern countries give the 
institutional  rationale  that  human  rights  should  deal  with  relationships 
between  governments  and  individuals,  not  relationships  between 
governments.  Meanwhile, the human rights community is attempting to 
expose the relationship between the northern governments and people in 
the  countries  that  are  victims  of  improperly  planned  and  implemented 
development projects and foreign direct investment.
a. External Debt
The Committee’s jurisprudence reveals some convergence between the 
Committee’s interpretation of the Covenant and the anti-poverty agenda of 
global  southern  civil  society.    The  Committee  routinely  touches  on 
globalization  issues  in  its  concluding  observations  regarding  member 
125. Hans-Otto  Sano,  Development  and  Human  Rights:  The  Necessary,  but  Partial 
Integration  of  Human  Rights  and  Development, 22  HUM.  RTS.  Q.  734,  752  (2000).  
Interestingly,  the  activists  who  worked  to  revive  the  international  economic,  social  and 
cultural rights enforcement regime began their campaign using the language of the N.I.E.O. 
See, e.g., Alston, Development and the Rule of Law, supra note 121, at 97.
126. A recent example of north-south split on this issue was the UN Commission on 
Human Rights vote on a resolution addressing the effects of structural adjustment policies 
and foreign debt on the full enjoyment of ESCRs. See UN Press Release, 57th Session, 
Commission on Human Rights Adopts Resolutions on Right to Food, Unilateral Coercive 
Measures, Foreign Debt, Adequate Housing, Education, and Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights  (Apr.  20,  2001),  found  at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/9264BBAA8CD8A618C1256A380027
43AE?opendocument (on file with author).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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states’ compliance with the Covenant.  In most instances, these comments 
assume  a  link  between  debt  burdens  and  structural  adjustment  and  the 
exacerbation  of  poverty.    For  example,  the  Committee  has  noted  the 
negative  ESCR  consequences  of  external  debt  servicing  for  Algeria,
127
Cameroon,






133  the  Philippines,
134  Paraguay,
135  Senegal,




139 The Committee should build 
127. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Algeria, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/17 
(1995).
128. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Cameroon, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.40 
(1999).
129. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Republic  of  the  Congo,  U.N.  ESCOR,  22d  Sess.,  22d mtg.  at  ¶  11,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.45 (2000).
130. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Honduras, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 25th mtg. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.57 
(2001).
131. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Jamaica, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 85th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.75 
(2001).
132. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Kyrgyzstan, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 51st mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.49 
(2000).
133. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41 
(1999) (noting that Mexico’s reduction of its foreign debt had “create[d] an environment 
conducive  to  a  more  effective  implementation  of  the  rights  under  the  Covenant”); 
Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights: 
Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/16 (1994) (listing 
“considerable  foreign  indebtedness”  among  “difficulties  severely  affect[ing]  the  most 
vulnerable segments of society”).
134. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Philippines, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., 14th mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/7 
(1995).
135. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Paraguay, U.N. ESCOR, 14th Sess., 22d mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.1 
(1996).
136. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Senegal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62 
(2001);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Senegal,  U.N.  ESCOR,  9th  Sess.,  48th  mtg.  at  ¶  5,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1993/18 
(1994).
137. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Solomon  Islands,  U.N.  ESCOR,  20th  Sess.,  24th  mtg.  at  ¶  10,  U.N.  Doc.  
E/C.12/1/Add.33 (1999).
138. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Sudan,  U.N.  ESCOR,  23d Sess.,  53d  mtg.  at  ¶  15,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.48 
(2000).
139. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Syrian  Arab  Republic,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  53d  mtg.  at  ¶  11,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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on  these  observations  by  polling  industrialized  governments  about  their 
positions on debt relief and urging them to use their influence to bring 
about meaningful debt relief.
b. International Financial Institutions
The UN human rights community is in the process of evaluating and 
identifying a role for itself vis-à-vis the international financial institutions.  
In  1999,  the  Commission  on  Human  Rights  created  the  Open-Ended 
Working  Group  on  Structural  Adjustment  Programmes  and  Economic, 
Social  and  Cultural  Rights  to  “elaborate  basic  policy  guidelines  on 
structural adjustment programmes and economic, social and cultural rights 
which  could  serve  as  a  basis  for  a  continued  dialogue  between  human 
rights  bodies  and  the  international  financial  institutions.”
140  As  of  the 
working  group’s  fourth  session  in  February  2001,  it  had  undertaken 
numerous consultations and no action had been taken.
141
The  Working  Group’s  recommendations  could  be  an  important  step 
toward expanding the Committee’s influence on aid spending and structural 
adjustment. The Committee has taken some preliminary actions as well.  In 
2000, the Committee Chairperson addressed a letter to the President of the 
World Bank and the Director-General of the IMF proposing a dialogue to 
explore the use of human rights and the Covenant in the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy  process.
142  Both  institutions  responded  affirmatively.
143  In  a 
140. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Open-ended Working Group on Structural 
Adjustment  Programmes  and  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights:  Note  by  the 
Secretariat, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2000/53 (2000).
141. See, e.g., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Open-ended Working Group on 
Structural Adjustment Programmes and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Note by the 
Secretariat, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 138, ¶¶ 3-
4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/53 (2000) (stating that at its third session, the working group 
took action only to elect a Chairperson and agree on holding a further session in spring 
2001);  Economic, Social and  Cultural  Rights:  Open-ended  working group  on  structural 
adjustment programmes and economic, social and cultural rights: Note by the secretariat, 
U.N.  Commission  on  Human  Rights,  57th  Sess.,  Agenda  Item  10,  at  ¶  2,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/57  (2001)  (stating  that  at  its  fourth  session,  the  Commission  decided  to 
postpone the working group session, because of the “numerous consultations held”).
142. Letter from the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights addressed to the President of the World Bank and to the Director-General of the 
International Monetary Fund, (Sept. 7, 2000) U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: Report on the Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Sessions, 
Annex VI, at 162-B, U.N. Doc. E/2001/22, E/C.12/2000/21.
143. See Letter from the President of the World Bank, in reply to the letter from the 
Chairperson  of  the  Committee,  Social,  and  Cultural  Rights  (Sept.  26,  2000),  U.N. 
Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights:  Report  on  the  Twenty-Second, 
Twenty-Third  and  Twenty-Fourth  Sessions,  Annex  VI,  at  164,  U.N.  Doc.  E/2001/22, 
E/C.12/2000/21 (2001); see also Letter dated 14 November 2000 from the Director-General 
of  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  in  reply  to  the  letter  from  the  Chairperson  of  the 3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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change  from  the  early  days  of  the  Committee’s  work,
144  in  recent 
Committee sessions both the IMF and the World Bank have participated as 
observers.
145 Because the Committee encourages NGO participation in its 
information gathering, the Committee’s interactions with the IFIs could be 
an  important  source  of  grass-roots  information  for  the  lending 
institutions.
146
The Committee posted on its website a series of papers presented at a 
spring 2001conference on globalization, addressing a range of areas that 
could inform norm development and practical monitoring strategies by the 
Committee.    The  subjects  included  global  economic  governance  and 
national autonomy,
147 economics,
148 gender equality and globalization,
149
trade and human rights,
150 as well as the International Monetary Fund.
151
This  is  the  only  posting  of  its  kind  on  the  Committee’s  website, 
demonstrating engagement with the issue of globalization.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Report  on  the  Twenty-Second,  Twenty-Third  and  Twenty-Fourth 
Sessions, Annex VI, at 165, U.N. Doc. E/2001/22, E/C.12/2000/21 (2001).
144. See CRAVEN, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 17, at 79 (noting that only the 
ILO, UNESCO, WHO and FAO attended any of the first nine sessions of the Committee).
145. Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights:  Report  on  the  Twenty-
Second, Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Sessions, U.N. ESCOR, at ¶ 8, E/2001/22, U.N. 
Doc.  E/C.12/2000/21  (2001)  (stating  that  regional  financial  institutions  have  not 
participated).
146. See, e.g., Carrasco & Kose, supra note 124, at 45 (stating that the IMF is “virtually 
unreachable by civil society”).
147. See Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: International Consultation “Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of International Institutions” organized in 
Cooperation  with  the  High  Council  for  International  Cooperation  (France),  25th  Sess., 
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2001/6 (2001).
148. See Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: International Consultation “Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of International Institutions” organized in 
cooperation  with  the  High  Council  for  International  Cooperation  (France),  25th  Sess., 
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/8 (2001).
149. See Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: International Consultation “Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of International Institutions” organized in 
cooperation  with  the  High  Council  for  International  Cooperation  (France),  25th  Sess., 
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/4 (2001).
150. See Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: International Consultation “Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of International Institutions” organized in 
cooperation  with  the  High  Council  for  International  Cooperation  (France),  25th  Sess., 
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/WP.2 (2001).
151. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic,  Social  Cultural  Rights:  International  Consultation  “Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of International Institutions” organized in 
cooperation  with  the  High  Council  for  International  Cooperation  (France),  25th  Sess., 
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/WP.5 (2001).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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To date, the UN human rights community has been frankly critical of the 
IFI’s  lynchpin  programming.    The  UN  Special  Rapporteur  on  the 
Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated in a report that 
despite  some  improvements  in  the  design  of  structural  adjustment 
programs, these programs “continue to have a daunting effect on human 
rights upon the capacities of legal regimes with obligation to fulfill and 
respect  these  rights”  neither  fully  protect[]  the  most  vulnerable”  nor 
“actually . . . decrease[] levels of impoverishment.”
152 A 2000 joint report 
by  the  Independent  Expert  on  Structural  Adjustment  Policies  and  the 
Special Rapporteur on the Effects of Foreign Debt on the full enjoyment of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights cited the “tortured history of debt 
relief  for  poor  countries”
153  forcefully  linking  poverty  and  structural 
adjustment programs and calling for debt relief.
154
The  Committee  occasionally  cites  IFI-produced  statistics
155  and  urges 
States Parties to reach out to IFIs for technical assistance.
156 But from the 
Committee’s point of view, perhaps the most significant aspect of the IFIs 
is  their  effect,  for  good  or  ill,  on  poverty.    The  Committee  has 
acknowledged  negative  consequences  of  both  internally  and  externally 
imposed structural adjustment policies, including privatization, in Algeria, 
Argentina, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Korea, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Romania, Senegal, the Solomon 
152. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Final Report Submitted 
by Danilo Türk, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 
41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16 (1992).
153. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Note by the Secretariat, Submitted by the 
Independent Expert on Structural Adjustment Policies and the Special Rapporteur on the 
Effects of Foreign Debt on the Full Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
U.N.  Commission  on  Human  Rights,  56th  Sess.,  Agenda  Item  10,  Exec.  Summ.,  U.N. 
E/CN.4/2000/51 (2000).
154. Id.  ¶  1-2,  U.N.  Doc.  E/CN.4/2000/51  (2000);  see  also  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural Rights: Effects of structural adjustment policies on the full enjoyment of human 
rights: Report by the Independent Expert, Mr. Fantu Cheru, submitted in accordance with 
Commission decisions 1998/102 and 1997/103, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 55th 
Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/50 (1999).
155. E.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Mongolia, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.47 
(2000);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Nigeria, U.N. ESCOR, 18th Sess., 9th mtg. at ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.23 
(1998). Both the Committee and commentators point to the importance of the international 
financial institutions in developing indicators useful to the Committee’s work. See CRAVEN, 
ICESCR, supra note 29, at 78 (citing remarks at the Committee’s sixth session, U.N. Doc. 
E/1992/23, Chap. VII, 81-86, ¶¶ 332-51, Supp. (No. 3) (1992)).
156. E.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Mongolia, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.47 
(2000); Concluding Observations: Report on the Technical Assistance Mission to Panama of 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., at ¶ 81, 
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Islands,    and  Venezuela.
157    In  the  case  of  Mauritius,  the  Committee 
endorsed the structural adjustment as successful and ESCR-protective.
158
The  Committee  pointed  out  in  its  Concluding  Observations  relating  to 
Azerbaijan  the  necessity  of  transparency  in  the  privatization  process.
159
When  reviewing  the  record  of  Belarus,  the  Committee  noted  that 
international aid was being withheld because of the government’s failure to 
introduce  certain  legal  and  economic  reforms,
160  and  at  least  implicitly 
endorsed this condition with the statement that “[m]any of the country’s 
present  economic  and  social  difficulties  show  the  need  to  expedite 
economic  reforms  and  to  build  up  democratic  institutions  based  on  the 
157. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Algeria, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 81st mtg. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.71 
(2001);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Argentina, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 52d mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.38 
(1999);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Bulgaria,  U.N.  ESCOR,  21st  Sess.,  50th-51st  mtgs.  at  ¶  9,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.37 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Cameroon, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.40 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Colombia, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 85th-86th mtgs. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.74 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Egypt,  U.N.  ESCOR,  22d  Sess.,  26th  mtg.  at  ¶  10,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.44 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: El Salvador, U.N. ESCOR, 14th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.4 (1996); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Honduras, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 25th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.57 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Republic of Korea, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 12, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.59 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Nepal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 55th mtg. at ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.66 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Netherlands, U.N. ESCOR, 18th Sess., 28th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.25 (1998); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Nicaragua,  U.N.  ESCOR,  9th  Sess.,  46th  mtg.  at  ¶  6,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1993/14 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Romania, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 25th-26th mtgs. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1994/4 (1994); Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural  Rights:  Senegal,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  53d  mtg.  at  ¶  10,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.62 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Senegal, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶¶ 5, 7, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1993/18 (1993); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Solomon Islands, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 24th mtg. at ¶¶ 10, 20, 
U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.33  (1999);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Venezuela, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 23d mtg. at ¶ 8, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.56 (2001).
158. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Mauritius, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 23d mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/8 
(1994).
159. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Azerbaijan, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.20 
(1997).
160. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Belarus,  U.N.  ESCOR,  15th  Sess.,  54th  mtg.  at  ¶  11,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.7/Rev.1 (1996).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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principles of the rule of law.”
161
The  Committee  interprets  the  Covenant  to  require  reform  measures 
protective of vulnerable populations who might be negatively impacted by 
structural adjustment,
162 and has commended the efforts of several States 
Parties to supplement structural adjustment programming with mitigating 
social spending.
163 In some cases the Committee has recommended specific 
protective reforms.
164 To date, the Committee’s concern appears to have 
been centered on the presence or absence of any type of IFI ameliorative 
social programming; the Committee has not commented on the extent or 
effectiveness or publicized existing critiques
165 of these programs.
In recent years, the Committee has begun to urge States Party to take 
their Covenant obligations into account when negotiating with IFIs.
166 The 
161. Id.
162. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Guinea,  U.N.  ESCOR,  14th  Sess.,  22d  mtg.  at  ¶  9,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.5 
(1996);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/16 
(1994);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Nicaragua, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 46th mtg. at ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/14 
(1994);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Kenya, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 19th mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/6 (1993).
163. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Algeria, U.N. ESCOR,  13th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/17 
(1995);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Suriname, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., 27th mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/6 
(1995);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Morocco,  U.N.  ESCOR,  10th  Sess.,  26th-27th  mtgs.  at  ¶  4,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1994/5 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural  Rights:  Uruguay,  U.N.  ESCOR,  10th  Sess.,  25th  mtg.  at  ¶  3,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1994/3 (1994).
164. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Morocco, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., 82d mtg. at ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.55 
(2000)  (recommending  adoption  of  “safety  nets”);  Concluding  Observations  of  the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Bulgaria, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 
50th-51st  mtgs.  at  ¶  24,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.37  (1999)  (recommending  socially 
protective alterations to “economic reform programmes” ); Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Algeria, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess., 
58th  mtg.  at  ¶  23,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1995/17  (1995)  (recommending  “continuous 
assess[ments]” of economic reforms and “special priority” for ameliorative social policies); 
Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights: 
Morocco,  U.N.  ESCOR,  10th  Sess.,  26th-27th  mtgs.  at  ¶  19,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1994/5 
(1994) (recommending adoption of “a system of taxation favoring direct and progressive 
taxes and the extension of the social security system”).
165. For examples of such criticisms, see Bharati Sadasivam, The Impact of Structural 
Adjustment on Women: A Governance and Human Rights Agenda, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 630, 
646  (1997)  (although  adjustment  lending  has  increasingly  included  social  spending,  the 
projects  tend  to  be  temporary  and  fail  to  reform  domestic  social  spending  institutions); 
Sheila Smith, The Social Dimensions of Structural Adjustment: A Change of Direction or a 
Figleaf?, in STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT  AND CRISIS  IN AFRICA: ECONOMIC  AND POLITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (1992).
166. See,  e.g., Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural  Rights:  Nepal,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  55th  mtg.  at  ¶  38,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.66 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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Committee also presses donor countries to use their sway with the IFIs to 
increase social spending.
167 Reflecting the lack of resources and the general 
standard  in  treaty  monitoring  body  concluding  observations,
168  the 
Committee’s statement regarding relations with IFIs have the feel of rote 
language and include no detail suggesting specific priorities or mechanisms 
to follow in these negotiations.  A recent statement urged a State Party to 
integrate  ESCRs  into  its  draft  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  Paper,
169
reflecting growing attention to the IFI negotiation process.
This  is  a  positive  direction  for  the  Committee  to  take.    Developing 
country  governments  have  notoriously  weak  hands  in  negotiations  with 
international financial institutions,
170 and need more leverage if they are to 
and Cultural Rights: Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 29, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001); Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Ukraine, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.65 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Georgia,  U.N.  ESCOR,  22d  Sess.,  21st  mtg.  at  ¶  22,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.42 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Jordan,  U.N.  ESCOR,  23d  Sess.,  51st  mtg.  at  ¶  28,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.46 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Morocco,  U.N.  ESCOR,  24th  Sess.,  82d  mtg.  at  ¶  38,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.55 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Mexico,  U.N.  ESCOR,  21st  Sess.,  54th  mtg.  at  ¶  34,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.41 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Bulgaria, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 50th-51st mtgs. at ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.37 (1999); see also Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Republic of Korea, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 12, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.59 (2001) (expressing “concern” that Korean government does not 
negotiate  with  IFIs  in  a  manner  protective  of  ESCRs);  Concluding  Observations  of  the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Egypt, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 26th 
mtg.  at  ¶  14,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.44  (2000)  (expressing  “regret[]”  that  Egyptian 
government does not negotiate with IFIs in a manner protective of ESCRs); Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Morocco, U.N. 
ESCOR,  24th  Sess.,  82d  mtg.  at  ¶  15,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.55  (2000)  (expressing 
“regret[]” that Moroccan government does not negotiate with IFIs in a manner protective of 
ESCRs).  In a recent session with the government of Korea, the first question put to the 
government  in  the  public  session  was  whether  the  government  had  raised  its  Covenant 
obligations in its negotiations with the IMF. Summary record of the second part (public)* of 
the 12th meeting : Republic of Korea , at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/SR.12 (2002).
167. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.68 
(2001);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Italy, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 23d mtg. at ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.43 (2000). 
Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights: 
Sweden, 27th Sess., 75th mtg.  at ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70 (2001); Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Finland, U.N. 
ESCOR, 24th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.52 (2000).
168. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 62.
169. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Senegal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62 
(2001).
170. See Anghie, Globalization, IFIs and the Third World, supra note 109, at 243, 256; 
Rajesh Swaminathan, Note, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case 
for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161, 
214 (1998).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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move  the  IFIs  toward  greater  attention  to  poverty  alleviation.    As  the 
Committee  pursues  discussions  with  the  IFIs,  its  recommendations  to 
member  states  should  become  increasingly  specific  and  meaningful.  
Having taken the all-important decision to refer to structural adjustment 
programming and negotiations, an additional useful step will be for the 
Committee  to  begin  to  routinely  inquire  into  issues  relating  to  IFI 
negotiations
171 and even, to the extent possible, time its reporting process to 
make  its  actions  and  suggestions  relevant  for  immediately  upcoming 
negotiation  events.  Growing  civil  society  attention  to  the  international 
financial institutions
172 offers a source of information for the Committee to 
access specific concerns about financing and projects.
With  these  recommendations,  the  author  may  diverge  from  the 
monolithic “postcolonial theory concerns” imagined in this paper. Anghie 
acknowledges  the  unrealized  potential  for  the  international  financial 
institutions to contribute to poverty reduction, but at the same time cautions 
that  this  contribution  would  form  part  of  “an  endless  dynamic  of 
intervening in, and reforming, the recalcitrant third world state in all its 
dimensions.”
173 The question might rest on whether the Committee merely 
assists States’ Parties to defend their own economic, social and cultural 
rights and obligations in their dealings with the IFIs, or whether it attempts 
to  influence  IFIs  to  adopt  and  expand  upon  the  World  Bank’s  recent 
practice
174 of conditioning aid on commitments to social spending.
175 The 
Committee should come down on this issue in the most principled manner 
available  to  it:  an  informed  evaluation  of  the  actual  impact  on  ESCR 
doctrine  and  implementation  of  the  World  Bank’s  social  spending 
171. Currently,  the  Committee’s  reporting  guidelines  include  no  questions  about 
international financial institutions. See Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content 
of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties: 
Report of the Secretary-General, at 5-25, HRI/GEN/2/Rev.1 (2001).  Only the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child includes an inquiry into international financial institutions and 
development aid in its reporting guidelines.  Id. at 57, ¶ 21.
172. See Dr. Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The Impact of Civil Society on the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization: The Case of the World 
Bank, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 399, 401 (2001).  For example, the author is not aware of 
an instance in which the Committee has made reference in its Concluding Observations to 
the World Bank Inspection Panel process.  Increased academic attention to the distributional 
effects  of  the  international  financial  institutions  has  expanded  accessibility  of  specific 
recommendations regarding IFI policies. See, e.g., Carrasco & Kose, supra note 124, at 44 
(recommending specific types of statistical research needed from the Bank to improve its 
ability to contribute to redistribution).
173. See Anghie, Globalization, IFIs and the Third World, supra note 109, at 287-288.
174. See Carrasco & Kose, supra note 124, at 44.
175. For an interesting discussion proposing that the international legal responsibilities 
of the IFIs correspond to the unique body of international treaty obligations undertaken by 
each country with which the IFI is working, see Daniel Bradlow & Claudio Grossman, 
Limited Mandates and intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and the 
IMF, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 411, 428 n.63 (1995).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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conditioning activities to date.
c. Overseas Development Aid
The Committee also occasionally urges donor States’ Party to increase 
their  development  assistance  spending,
176  and  praises  governments  that 
show  a  high  commitment  to  giving.
177  In  a  recent  “Concluding 
Observation”,  the  Committee  took  the  further  step  of  documenting  the 
percentage of the overseas development aid “devoted to areas related to the 
rights contained in the Covenant.”
178 As another key source of resources for 
the  protection  of  economic,  social  and  cultural  rights,  the  content  and 
distribution of overseas development aid is worthy of expanded attention.
d. Trade Relations
Although the Committee works more closely with the ILO than with any 
other agency
179 and devotes a good deal of attention to labor issues in its 
monitoring activities,
180 human rights issues relating to international trade 
176. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Finland,  U.N.  ESCOR,  24th  Sess.,  75th  mtg.  at  ¶¶  13,  23,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.52 (2000); see also Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Philippines, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., 29th mtg. at ¶ 24, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1995/7 (1995) (stating generally the need for more ODA “social adjustment 
programmes”).
177. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Japan,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  56th  mtg.  at  ¶  4,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.67 
(2001);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70 
(2001);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Denmark, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.34 
(1999);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Ireland,  U.N.  ESCOR,  20th  Sess.,  25th-26th  mtgs.  at  ¶  4,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.35 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Finland,  U.N.  ESCOR,  15th  Sess.,  51st  mtg.  at  ¶  8,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.8 (1996).
178. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Japan,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  56th  mtg.  at  ¶  4,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.67 
(2001).
179. See CRAVEN, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 79 (noting that the ILO 
is the only agency that attended every one of the Committee’s first nine sessions); id. at 224 
(arguing that the Committee’s appropriate role regarding labor rights protection is to provide 
supplementary monitoring to countries that have not ratified specific ILO conventions); id.
at 260 (arguing that the negotiators of the ICESCR contemplated a major role for the ILO in 
monitoring  the  Covenant);  id.  at  285  (noting  that  ILO  representatives  have  provided 
important assistance and information to the Committee); but see id. at 357 (decrying the 
“minimal level” of the ILO’s cooperation with the Committee).
180. See,  e.g., Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural  Rights:  Japan,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  56th  mtg.  at  ¶¶  18,  45,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.67 (2001) (citing various ILO conventions); Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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relations  and  multinational  corporations  rarely  arise  in  the  Committee’s 
statements.  The Committee recommended to Mexico that it take “energetic 
steps to mitigate any negative impact” of the NAFTA on ESCRs.
181 In its 
observations to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Committee predicted 
that  a  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  Body  decision  might  “have  adverse 
consequences” for the government’s ability to adhere to the Covenant.
182
The  Committee  also  noted  the  negative  effects  of  the  trade  embargo 
imposed on Armenia by neighboring countries.
183 In its Honduran Closing 
Arguments,  the  Committee  “strongly  recommends  that  the  State  party 
implement  existing  legislative  and  administrative  measures  to  avoid 
violations of environmental and labor laws by transnational companies,”
184
and that the Syrian government take its Covenant obligations into account 
when negotiating with the World Trade Organization.
185
The Committee should continue, and significantly enhance, these efforts 
to  expand  the  scope  of  its  scrutiny.  Private  companies  engaging  in 
significantly  deleterious  business  practices  can  be  named  and  their 
activities  should  be  raised  with  governments  most  responsible  for  their 
existence.  The Committee has been pragmatic and activist in its procedural 
arrangements; it must continue to be as creative as possible to identify the 
most  significant  potential  sources  for  protecting  economic,  social  and 
cultural rights, and working with its own constituency of States’ Parties to 
access them.
46th mtg. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/17 (1994) (referring to the ILO Committee of 
Experts and ILO Convention No. 111).
181. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41 
(1999);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/16 
(1994).  In  its  1999  Concluding  Observations  on  Mexico,  the  Committee  commended 
Mexico  for  the  measures  it  had  taken.    Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 6, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41 (1999).
182. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 45th mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.21 (1997).
183. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Armenia, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.39 
(1999).
184. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Honduras, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 25th mtg. at ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.57 
(2001).
185. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Syrian  Arab  Republic,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  53d  mtg.  at  ¶  29,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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2. Military Action
The harmful effect of military actions on economic, social and cultural 
rights  arises  occasionally  in  Committee  statements.  The  Committee  has 
recognized  security  concerns,
186  ongoing  wars,
187  internal  military 
clashes,
188 concluded transnational and civil wars,
189 and regional conflicts 
not involving the State Party.
190 The Committee argues that violence in 
Colombia is “in part brought about” by maldistribution of wealth.
191
North-on-south actions have arisen in a few cases.  The Committee noted 
186. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Israel,  U.N.  ESCOR,  19th  Sess.,  53d  mtg.  at  ¶  7,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.27 
(1998).
187. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Azerbaijan, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.20 
(1997).
188. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Kyrgyzstan, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 51st mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.49 
(2000);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:Republic  of  the  Congo,  U.N.  ESCOR,  22d  Sess.,  22d  mtg.  at  ¶  8,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.45 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Georgia,  U.N.  ESCOR,  22d  Sess.,  21st  mtg.  at  ¶  6,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.42 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Sri  Lanka,  U.N.  ESCOR,  18th Sess.,  25th  mtg.  at  ¶  5,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.24 (1998); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Peru,  U.N.  ESCOR,  16th  Sess.,  26th  mtg.  at  ¶  12,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.14 (1997); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Colombia, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 179, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1995/12 (1996); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Algeria, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶¶ 3, 14, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1995/17 (1995); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Philippines,  U.N.  ESCOR,  12th  Sess.,  29th  mtg.  at  ¶  9,  U.N. 
Doc.E/C.12/1995/7,  (1995);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Kenya, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 19th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1993/6 (1993).
189. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Republic  of  the  Congo,  U.N.  ESCOR,  22d  Sess.,  22d  mtg.  at  ¶  9,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.45 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Iraq,  U.N.  ESCOR,  17th  Sess.,  52d  mtg.  at  ¶  7,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.17 (1997); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Peru,  U.N.  ESCOR,  16th  Sess.,  26th  mtg.  at  ¶  12,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.14 (1997); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: El Salvador, U.N. ESCOR, 14th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.4 (1996); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Nicaragua,  U.N.  ESCOR,  9th  Sess.,  46th  mtg.  at  ¶  5,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1993/14 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Vietnam,  U.N.  ESCOR,  8th  Sess.,  19th  mtg.  at  ¶  8,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1993/8 (1993).
190. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Bulgaria,  U.N.  ESCOR,  21st  Sess.,  50th-50st  mtgs.  at  ¶  8,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.37 (1999).
191. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Colombia, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 179, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/12 
(1996).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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the loss of housing stock when the United States invaded Panama,
192 and 
has  documented  the  effects  of  international  embargos.
193  However,  it 
appears to have made no recommendations to a State Party regarding its 
participation in the decision to continue or impose an embargo.
B. Differential Treatment of Southern States
A  second  relevant  aspect  of  post-colonial  theory  is  its  general 
attentiveness to “a history still in process,” or the currently discriminatory 
aspects  of  international  action,  and  the  differential  impact  on  southern 
states vis-à-vis the former colonizer states.
194 Fitzpatrick and Darian-Smith 
call human rights “the ‘new’ standard replacing civilization as the criterion 
for  dividing  and  judging  the  world”
195  as  an  “instrument  of  occidental 
assertion.”
196 Elements of the ICESCR regime particularly responsive to 
this concern include the Committee’s equalization paradigms and use of 
enforcement language, the Committee’s attention to its anti-discrimination 
mandate, and the audience for its recommendations.  These aspects of the 
Committee’s  work  lend  themselves  favorably  to  a  post-colonial  theory 
review.  Another related aspect of the Committee’s work tends instead to 
confirm  a  classic  north-south  critique  of  the  human  rights  regime:  the 
Committee’s treatment of culturally based practices.
1. Equalization Paradigms and Enforcement Language
Apart from the north-south implications of the Committee’s attention to 
factors  such  as  structural  adjustment  and  violent  conflicts, 
acknowledgement  of  these  realities  carries  particular  legal  significance.  
This  is  because  of  the  significant  “margin  of  discretion”  codified  in 
192. Concluding Observations: Report on the Technical Assistance Mission to Panama 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., at ¶ 
21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/18 (1995) (noting that the United States invasion resulted in the 
destruction of “hundreds of dwellings”); id. at ¶ 62 (discussing financing by USAID and the 
government  for  repair  of  damage  due  to  the  “military  action”).  The  Committee  also 
documented an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights complaint by Panamanian 
civil society regarding the allocation of individual awards for invasion losses. Id. at ¶¶ 63-
65.
193. E.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Iraq, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 52d mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.17 (1997) 
(oil  embargo);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural Rights: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, U.N. ESCOR, 16th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 13, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.15 (1997) (Security Council aerial embargo).
194. See Gandhi, supra note 108, at 18 (quoting David Lloyd, 1993, p. 11); id. at 17-18; 
see also SAN JUAN, supra note 107, at 9 (describing post-colonial theory as concerned with 
“manifestations of ‘unevenness’”); see also YOUNG, supra note 4, at 11.
195. See  Fitzpatrick  &  Darian-Smith,  supra  note  2,  at  5  (citing  G.W.  GONG,  THE 
STANDARD OF “CIVILIZATION” IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 18 (1984)).
196. Id.3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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Covenant article 2(1), in which each State Party “undertakes to take steps 
. . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively  the  full  realization  of  the  rights  recognized”  in  the 
Covenant.
197  Although  the  Committee  has  interpreted  the  obligation  as 
tightly  as  possible,
198  nonetheless  a  determination  of  a  State  Party’s 
available resources, or lack thereof, becomes relevant to its inquiry into 
individual states’ implementation of the Covenant.
199
The  Committee  continues  to  acknowledge  difficulty  factors  in  a 
“Concluding  Observations”  section  entitled  “Factors  and  Difficulties 
Impeding  the  Implementation  of  the  Covenant.”  The  Committee  rarely 
passes explicit judgment on a claimed factor as a valid excuse for failure to 
implement  the  Covenant.  However,  its  acknowledgement  of  particular 
difficulties ranges in strength from asserting that a problem “ha[s] seriously 
affected the capacity of the State party to implement the Covenant,”
200 to 
“recognizing”  that  a  particular  problem  is  an  impediment  to  the 
government’s “capacity to enhance the enjoyment of ESCRs,”
201 to merely 
“not[ing]  the  State  party’s  statement”  about  the  impact  of  a  negative 
factor.
202  The  Committee  labeled  as  “technical”  Canada’s  problem 
gathering  statistics  from  its  constituent  federal  units,
203  and  explicitly 
dismissed proffered difficulties in a few cases, including Iceland’s assertion 
that it could not implement the right to strike because of its economy’s 
dependence  on  one  industry.
204  The  Committee  has  also  made  specific 
findings that several industrialized States’ Party suffer no impediments to 
197. ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 2(1).
198. See, e.g., The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, ¶ 1): CESCR General 
Comment 3, at ¶ 2 (1990) (noting that the obligation “to take steps” is not itself limited); id.
at ¶ 5 (finding several Covenant articles to be “capable of immediate application”); id. at ¶ 9 
(interpreting  “progressive  realization”  to  prohibit  retrogressive  measures)  [hereinafter 
General Comment 3].
199. See CRAVEN, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 138-39.
200. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Jamaica, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 85th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.75 
(2001) (stating the existance of financial crisis and high debt burden have made it difficult 
to implement the ICESCR).
201. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Syrian  Arab  Republic,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  53d  mtg.  at  ¶  11,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001) (emphasis added) (explaining the country’s high debt burden as a 
reason for not fulfilling its obligations under the ICESCR).
202. Id. at ¶ 10 (explaining that the partial foreign occupation of its territory resulting in 
a need for higher military spending).
203. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Canada,  U.N.  ESCOR,  8th  Sess.,  18th  mtg.  at  ¶  11,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1993/5 
(1993).
204. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights:  Iceland,  U.N.  ESCOR,  9th  Sess.,  46th  mtg.  at  ¶  7,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1993/15 
(1994).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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implementation at all.
205
Though  the  Committee  has  been  passing  judgment  on  member 
governments’  implementation  of  the  Covenant  for  fifteen  years,  it  has 
classified relatively few situations as actual violations of the Covenant. The 
only routinely declared violation is the failure to comply with the Covenant 
reporting obligations.
206 Other examples of state acts found to be violations 
include:  discrimination,
207  travel  restrictions,
208  high  teen  suicide  and 
domestic violence rates,
209 failure to provide maternity benefits,
210 forced 
205. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: France, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 77th mtg. at ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.72 
(2001);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70 
(2001);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Iceland, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 20th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.32 
(1999);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Ireland,  U.N.  ESCOR,  20th  Sess.,  25th-26th  mtgs.  at  ¶  8,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.35 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.N. ESCOR, 
11th  Sess.,  53d  mtg.  at  ¶  6,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1994/19  (1994).  See  also  Concluding 
Observations of the Committee  on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Austria, U.N. 
ESCOR, 11th Sess., 52d mtg. at passim, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/16 (1994) (lacking “factors 
and difficulties” section); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 46th mtg. at passim, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1993/17 (1994) (lacking “factors and difficulties” section).
206. See,  e.g., Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural  Rights:  Togo,  U.N.  ESCOR,  25th  Sess.,  26th  mtg.  at  ¶¶  3,  17,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.61 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Rebublic of the Congo, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 22d mtg. at ¶¶ 3, 24, 
U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.45  (2000);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Solomon Islands, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 24th 
mtg. at ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.33 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, U.N. ESCOR, 
17th  Sess.,  45th  mtg.  at  ¶¶  3,  5,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.21  (1997);  Concluding 
Observations of the Committee  on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Guinea, U.N. 
ESCOR,  14th  Sess.,  22d  mtg.  at  ¶  2,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.5  (1996);  Concluding 
Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights:  Mali,  U.N. 
ESCOR,  11th  Sess.,  44th  mtg.  at  ¶  2,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1994/17  (1994);  Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Mauritius, U.N. 
ESCOR,  10th  Sess.,  43d  mtg.  at  ¶  2,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1994/8  (1994);  Concluding 
Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights:  Kenya,  U.N. 
ESCOR, 8th Sess., 19th mtg. at ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/6 (1993).
207. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Iran, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 20th mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/7 (1993).
208. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Israel, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 47th mtg. at ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.69 
(2001);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Israel,  U.N.  ESCOR,  19th  Sess., 53d  mtg.  at  ¶  17,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.27 
(1998).
209. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Sri Lanka, U.N. ESCOR, 18th Sess., 25th mtg. at ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.24 
(1998).
210. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Switzerland,  U.N.  ESCOR,  19th  Sess.,  55th  mtg.  at  ¶  15,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.30 (1998).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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evictions,
211  failure  to  accord  economic,  social  and  cultural  rights 
constitutional status,
212 minimum wage five times below the “officially set 
basic food basket,”
213 and promulgation of a law asserting close control 
over NGOs.
214 Interestingly enough, a comfort level with using stronger 
language about failures to report may have a different north-south impact, 
as states with overdue reports are statistically more likely to be developing 
countries.
215 At the same time, given the fact that few negative implications 
attach  to  neglect  of  reporting  duties,  the  possibility  of  escaping  notice 
through non-reporting could be a strong motive for some states.
216 Apart 
from  this  aspect,  the  violations  findings  focused  on  both  southern  and 
northern countries, and no State Party, even one receiving high praise from 
the  Committee,  escapes  receiving  numerous  recommendations  about 
progressive steps to be taken,
217 suggesting that the primary goal of the 
reporting process is facilitative rather than judgmental.
2. Fundamental Nature of the Recommendations
As the Article 2(1) analysis suggests, protection of economic, social and 
cultural rights is to some extent dependent on available resources.  Given 
this reality, the Committee’s primary task is to identify available areas of 
discretion, and urge the most rights-protective policy choices on States-
Party and the inter-governmental agencies amenable to the Committee’s 
blandishments.    With  the  number  of  international  agencies  focused  on 
poverty  alleviation,  it  may  seem  somewhat  surprising  at  what  a 
fundamental level many of the Committee’s recommendations arise. For 
example, the Committee frequently advocates that States Parties collect and 
211. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Dominican  Republic,  U.N.  ESCOR,  11th  Sess.,  55th  mtg.  at  ¶  8,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1994/15 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights:  Nicaragua,  U.N.  ESCOR,  9th  Sess.,  46th  mtg.  at  ¶  9,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1993/14 (1994).
212. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Israel,  U.N.  ESCOR,  19th  Sess.,  53d  mtg.  at  ¶  9,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.27 
(1998).
213. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41 
(1999).
214. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Egypt, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.44 
(2000).
215. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 9 (pointing to a reduced level of human rights 
protection as another reason for poor reporting).
216. See id. (noting that the late submission of a state report is generally ignored).
217. See,  e.g., Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural  Rights:  Sweden,  U.N.  ESCOR,  27th  Sess.,  75th  mtg.  at  ¶¶  15-42,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.70 (2001).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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disseminate data on basic poverty issues, including data on homelessness 
and hunger.
218 In the Concluding Observations for industrialized countries, 
recommendations tend to center on the need for data on more specialized 
issues,  such  as  AIDS  and  domestic  violence.
219  The  Committee  urged 
Finland to establish a legal minimum wage,
220 and Uruguay to make its 
minimum  wage  more  than  “only  . . .  an  indicator.”
221  The  Concluding 
Observations for Australia, Canada, Egypt, and Germany reveal that those 
countries have not established an official poverty line.
222 From a north-
south-sensitive perspective, it seems clear that these types of fundamental 
recommendations are frequently issued to industrialized countries.
3. Vulnerable Populations
To the extent that post-colonial theory particularly works to highlight 
concerns about race,
223 the Committee’s interpretation of its Article 2(2) 
anti - discrimination mandate is worth mentioning.  Article 2(2) guarantees 
218. See,  e.g., Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and 
Cultural  Rights:  Sweden,  U.N.  ESCOR,  27th  Sess.,  75th  mtg.  at  ¶  40,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.70  (2001)  (privatization  of  health  care);  Concluding  Observations  of  the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Suriname, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., 
27th mtg. at ¶¶ 9, 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/6 (1995) (vulnerable populations, working and 
abandoned children, and the informal sector); Concluding Observations of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Iraq, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 26th-27th mtgs. at 
¶  10,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1994/6  (1994)  (educational  opportunities);  Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: New Zealand, 
U.N.  ESCOR,  9th  Sess.,  40th  mtg.  at  ¶¶  15,  21,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1993/13  (1994) 
(malnutrition, hunger and homelessness).
219. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Finland, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.52 
(2000)  (domestic  violence);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 23, U.N. 
Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.29  (1998)  (AIDS);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., 27th mtg. at ¶ 10, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/5 (1995) (domestic violence).
220. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Finland, U.N. ESCOR, 15th Sess., 51st mtg. at ¶¶ 13, 23, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.8 
(1996).
221. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Uruguay, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 54th mtg. ¶¶ 9, 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.18
(1997).
222. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Australia, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 55th mtg. ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.50 
(2000);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Canada,  U.N.  ESCOR,  19th  Sess.,  58th  mtg.  ¶  13,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.31 
(1998);  Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 54th mtg. ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.29 
(1998).
223. See,  e.g., PETER  FITZPATRICK,  THE  MYTHOLOGY  OF  MODERN  LAW  (1992);  Ruth 
Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 903, 967 (1997).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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equal  enjoyment  of  ESCRs  regardless  of  “race,  colour,  sex,  language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or  other  status.”
224  The  Committee  has  interpreted  2(2)  as  one  of  the 
Covenant  articles  that  is  fully  justiciable  and  capable  of  immediate 
application.
225
Many of the General Comments include a non-discrimination analysis on 
the protection of indigenous and other minority groups,
226 as do most of the 
Concluding  Observations.    For  example,  the  recent  Concluding 
Observation  on  Sweden  included  comments  and  recommendations 
concerning  “discrimination  against  immigrants  and  refugees  in  the 
workplace, ratification of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
and  provision  of  education  in  minority  and  immigrant  languages”.
227
Similarly, the Committee consistently raises concerns regarding gender.
228
4. Treatment of Cultural and Religious Practices
Postcolonial  theory  flags  the  difficult  issue  of  cultural  relativism. 
224. ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 2(2).
225. Twenty-first session (1999)
: General Comment No. 13 The right to education (art. 
13), in English Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 74, 81-82 ¶¶ 31-37 HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001).
226. See  Sixth  Session  (1991):  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights 
General Comment No. 4, The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant) in
English  Compilation  of  General  Comments  and  General  Recommendations  Adopted  by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 22, 25 ¶ 9, 27 ¶ 17, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001); Thirteenth 
session (1995)
: General Comment No. 6 The economic, social and cultural rights of older 
persons,  in  English  Compilation  of  General  Comments  and  General  Recommendations 
Adopted  by  Human  Rights  Treaty  Bodies,  at  38,  39  ¶  5,  HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5  (2001); 
Sixteenth session (1997):General Comment No. 7 The right to adequate housing (art. 11(1) 
of  the  Covenant):  forced  evictions,  in  English  Compilation  of  General  Comments  and 
General  Recommendations  Adopted  by  Human  Rights  Treaty  Bodies,  at  49,  51  ¶  10, 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001); Nineteenth session (1998)
: General Comment No. 9 The domestic 
application of the Covenant, in English Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations  Adopted  by  Human  Rights  Treaty  Bodies,  at  58,  60  ¶  9, 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001); Twenty-first session (1999)
: General Comment No. 13 The right 
to  education  (art.  13),  in  English  Compilation  of  General  Comments  and  General 
Recommendations  Adopted  by  Human  Rights  Treaty  Bodies,  at  74,  75  ¶  4 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001); see also id. at 81-82 ¶¶ 31-37; Twenty-second session (2000)
: 
General Comment No. 14 The right to the highest attainable standard of health (art. 12), in
English  Compilation  of  General  Comments  and  General  Recommendations  Adopted  by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 90, 90 ¶ 2, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001).
227. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 75th mtg. ¶¶ 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70 
(2001) (“discrimination on ethnic grounds in the workplace”); id. ¶ 28 (Sami land rights); 
id.  ¶  29  (discrimination  against  immigrants  and  refugees);  id.  ¶  17  (ratification  of  the 
Indigenous  and  Tribal  Peoples  Convention);  id.  ¶  30  (gender  participation  in  the  labor 
market); id. ¶ 38 (instruction in minority/immigrant languages); id. ¶¶ 23, 39 (exploitation 
of minors and women abroad).
228. See id. ¶ 30 (expressing concern with the issue of gender participation in the labor 
market); see also id. ¶ 39 (remarking on the exploitation of women abroad).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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Rolando Gaete poses cultural relativism as one of “two opposite dangers 
. . .  to  be  avoided:  the  absolutism  of  certain  appeals  to  culture  and  the 
absolutism  of  a  humanist  secular  fundamentalism.”
229  Leela  Ghandi 
describes the dilemma this way: “Caught between the harsh extremes of 
ethnic  cleansing,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  militaristic  American 
purification  of  the  un-American  world  on  the  other,  post-colonialism 
ponders a ceasefire.”
230
The  Committee  has  not,  of  course,  escaped  grappling  with  questions 
about cultural and religious practices that clash with human rights norms.  
To date, it has taken a universalist stance on many customary practices, 
commending prosecution of practitioners of female genital mutilation,
231
and condemning customary practices such as low legal age of marriage for 
girls,
232 forced marriage of widows to brothers-in-law,
233 sexual servitude 
to  religious leaders,
234  polygamy,
235  restrictions  on abortion,
236  gendered 
Aboriginal  marital  property  rights,
237  and  “deeply  rooted  traditions  and 
cultural prejudices [that] marginalize certain categories of persons, such as 
migrant  workers  and  some  women.”
238  In  one  interesting  instance,  the 
Republic of Korea government asserted a cultural norm of high esteem for 
229. Rolando  Gaete,  Rites  of  Passage  into  the  Global  Village,  in LAWS  OF  THE 
POSTCOLONIAL 233, 235 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999).
230. Ghandi, supra note 108, at 129.
231. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: France, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 77th mtg. ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.72 (2001); 
see also Review of the Implementation of CESCR: Togo, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 26th 
mtg. ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.61 (2001) (commending Togo’s promotional attempts to 
lower instances of FGM).
232. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. ¶¶ 12, 14, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001).
233. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Zimbabwe, U.N. ESCOR, 16th Sess., 25th mtg. ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.12 
(1997).
234. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Nepal,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  55th  mtg.  ¶¶  10,  18,  43,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.66 (2001).
235. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Senegal,  U.N.  ESCOR,  26th  Sess.,  53d  mtg.  ¶  39,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.62 
(2001).
236. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Poland,  U.N.  ESCOR,  18th  Sess.,  26th  mtg.  ¶  12,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.26 
(1998).
237. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Canada,  U.N.  ESCOR,  19th  Sess.,  57th  mtg.  ¶  29,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1/Add.31 
(1998).
238. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Republic  of  Korea,  U.N.  ESCOR,  25th  Sess.,  26th  mtg.  ¶  10,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.59 (2001).3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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teachers  as  its  reason  for  limiting  teachers’  union  activities.
239  The 
Committee  rejected  this  rationale.
240  The  Committee  also  noted  that 
“prevailing  Chinese  traditions”  favoring  “avoiding  direct  confrontations 
and  strikes  in  favour  of  personal  or  family  ties”  hamper  collective 
bargaining and strikes in Macau.
241
C. The Poorest Child in the Poorest Country
A  third  concern  found  in  the  postcolonial  theoretical  literature  is  a 
concern with the need to elevate the voices of the most oppressed people.
242
Seeking  theoretical  integrity,  post-colonial  academics  present  important 
challenges to the human rights regime, but appear to be sympathetic to 
many of the values at least facially expressed in human rights standards.  
Predictably, this is not an uncomplicated relationship.  One of foundational 
concepts of postcolonial theory is the notion of subalternity.  The theorists 
use subalternity to mean both “the in-between class,” or the indigenous 
“lieutenants  of  the  ruling  class  as  opposed  to  the  masses.”
243  However, 
Young points out that the focus of the influential Subaltern Studies journal 
is “very much at the bottom of the social scale.”
244 At the conference for 
which this paper was produced, one of the noted post-colonial theorists 
present stated that he, and, he felt sure, many of his colleagues, had “said 
things” at human rights conferences for which they felt ashamed.
In  translating  these  admittedly  reluctant  activist  orientations  into  the 
specific work of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
there is clearly a large and meaningful area of overlap.  Within the bounds 
of international coercion that postcolonial theory might “tolerate,” it seems 
that  the  key  question  is  one  of  effectiveness.    Like  most  human  rights 
entities, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has a 
broad mandate and severely insufficient resources for carrying it out.  The 
Committee  is  charged  with  management  of  142  treaty  signatories, 
standards development and promotion and outreach to technical agencies, 
239. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights: Nepal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 55th mtg. ¶ 10, 18, 43, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.66 
(2001).
240. Id.
241. Concluding  Observations  of  the  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights:  Portugal  (Macau),  U.N.  ESCOR,  15th  Sess.,  54th  mtg.  ¶  8,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.9 (1996).
242. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 4, at 354.  But see San Juan, supra note 107, at 13 
(stating that “outside of the multiculturalism debate,” postcolonial theory has failed to focus 
attention on important concerns that “elude representation in the postal conversation,” such 
as refugees, political prisoners, refugees, unjust wars, and vulnerable workers).
243. YOUNG, supra note 4, at 354.
244. Id.3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078 7/15/2004 12:05 PM
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but currently has the assistance of only two UN secretariat staff members. 
The Committee rarely travels, and never on its own budget, so it has to rely 
on the fact finding of other agencies, which are rarely specialized enough to 
meet  the  Committee’s  needs,  and  the  work  of  governments  and  civil 
society participating in the reporting process. Despite strategic work on the 
part  of  the  Committee  and  the  many  attempts  of  the  Committee’s 
constituent  international  NGOs  to  support  domestic  civil  society,
245  this 
limitation inevitably cuts off much participation by southern NGOs and 
relevant domestic government actors.
246 The resulting northern bias in the 
discussions clearly does no one any good.
V. CONCLUSION
In making these suggestions for the priorities and development of the 
Committee, the author cannot help but feel the legacy of a little-known 
Hungarian  political  writer  named  Zoltán  Szilágyi.  Dr.  Szilágyi’s  1986 
treatise,  The  United  Nations’  Role  in  the  Liquidation  of  Colonialism, 
fulsomely  celebrated  the  work  of  the  UN  Special  Committee  on  the 
Implementation of the Declaration on Decolonisation.  Published by the 
Hungarian  Academy  of  Sciences  Institute  for  World  Economy,  Dr. 
Szilágyi’s treatise pledged the support of socialist nations in “the fight for 
economic de-colonization.”
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The existence of one more obscure committee, and moreover one that 
may  soon  be  subsumed  in  a  larger  body  with  a  massive  mandate,  can 
hardly seem to matter, for example, to a malnourished child living in a poor 
country, on the brink of a painful, utterly preventable death of dysentery.  
Moreover, the days appear to be gone when a UN Committee will request 
that the Secretary General “undertake . . . a sustained and broad campaign 
. . . informing world public opinion of the facts concerning the pillaging of 
natural  resources  in  colonial  territories  and  the  exploitation  of  their 
indigenous  populations  by  foreign  monopolies.”
248  With  neither  the 
splendid rhetoric of the 1970s nor the heat of the anti-apartheid movement, 
the legacy of the Committee’s first fifteen years may have to stand or fall 
on  the  references  to  the  General  Comment  3  in  Grootboom,  the 
groundbreaking South African constitutional case granting limited housing 
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to liaison directly with national NGO’s access by national NGO’s will be uneven).
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rights to displaced people.
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However, to the extent that post-colonial theory is generically concerned 
with revealing the otherwise hidden messages of the “subaltern,” and “the 
suffering,” its goals would seem to converge with those of the Committee 
and the activists influencing its development.  Identifying and alleviating 
suffering in the global south must involve leveraging important sources of 
power and resources.  The international financial community, both private 
and inter-governmental, commands significant control and resources in the 
global south, all sides must agree that influencing it in a re-distributive 
direction  is  critical  to  the  goal  of  alleviating  suffering.  The  Committee 
should work to become expert in operations of the international financial 
institutions  and  multi-national  corporations,  and  partner  with  its  states 
parties to manage their interactions with these powerful actors in a way that 
lessens human suffering.
Differences  clearly  exist.  Post-colonialists  might  urge  the  Committee 
away from taking coercive measures against former colonies, because of 
the impossibility of erasing the historical taint and the attendant likelihood 
of  inappropriate  and  counterproductive  intervention.    A  human  rights 
activist  might  urge  the  Committee  to  use  any  tool  at  its  disposal  to 
maximize  its  influence  over  the  potentially  re-distributive  policies  of 
former  colonies.    A  post-colonial  agenda  for  the  Committee  would 
doubtless  include  a  greater  attention  to  regional  diversity  in  the 
Committee’s  membership and  staff,  an  issue  that  has  not  been  strongly 
pressed by the civil society currently interacting with the Committee.
The decisions the Committee makes about its priorities and methods are 
critically important.  The Committee provides at least some counterpoint to 
the relentless privatization and trickle down economics peddled elsewhere 
in the international community.  It has proven that it can make an impact in 
the formation of progressive new soft law on remedial welfare issues.  The 
Committee  is  leveraging  marginal  international  resources  uniquely  to 
advocate  and  support  policies  that  will  benefit  the  poorest  child  in  the 
poorest  country.  Upendra  Baxi  summarizes  the  argument  best:  “[T]he 
nirvana that contemporary human rights seek is sometimes said to suffer 
from  a  relatively  impoverished  cosmology.    However,  human  rights 
activism has its own dharma, which is the performance of righteous deeds 
(karma)  which,  too,  earn  merit  (punnya)  to  redeem  the  “soul.”
250  The 
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International  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  has 
made important strides in its first fifteen years, and must continue to use 
creative efforts to carry out its critical mission of speaking for the poor.
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 154 (1998).